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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of non-standard economic behavior. The first chapter
concerns two widely observed violations of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,
the Compromise and Attraction effects. I construct a novel method of representing
them by reducing the context of a menu to a frame, encompassing the worst option
along each attribute in the menu, and observing a collection of preferences indexed
by frames. The agent behaves as though a good’s attractiveness along each attribute
is judged relative to the frame with declining marginal utility. This allows me to give
a novel interpretation of the compromise and attraction effects: they are consistent
with indifference curves rotating clockwise as the frame moves down, and counter-
clockwise as it goes left. It also allows me to give a representation theorem showing
the behavioral axioms associated with a utility representation taking a good and the
frame as arguments.
The second chapter applies the representation from Chapter One to electoral poli-
tics. It shows that incorporating these preferences generates equilibria where extrem-
ist candidates enter plurality elections in order to attractively frame their preferred
moderate candidate, even if the extremists have probability zero of obtaining office
themselves. While such candidates are frequently observed in elections, and there are
papers generating equilibria with centrist sure losers (including Solow (2015)), this is
iv
the first paper generating equilibria with these extremist candidates without unusual
assumptions on election rules, or non single-peaked preferences. This paper creates
a four candidate equilibrium with two extremist sure loser candidates, each on the
fringes of opinion.
The third chapter concerns the effect of guilt on preferences in the circumstance
of gift giving. A decision maker who experiences guilt may receive an increase in
surplus from a gift card allowing guilt-free indulgence, potentially beyond even the
surplus she’d receive from an equivalent cash gift. This paper isolates the behavior
of guilt avoidance by exploiting a multi-period setting which incorporates a distinc-
tion between the decision maker’s preferences over what she’d receive, and what she
would choose. A representation inspired by Kopylov (2009) is adapted to this setting,
providing a representation theorem for these preferences.
v
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Chapter 1
The Compromise and Attraction Effects
Through Frame Preferences
1.1 Introduction
Among the well-documented violations of the standard choice axioms are effects of
menu and context not included in canonical theory. In the standard model of decision
making, agents are aware of the entire universe of goods, with a clear personal ranking
of said goods. Such an agent should, therefore, be immune to any effects related to
the inclusion or exclusion of a good from a menu. However, contra this standard
model, there is mounting evidence1 of such effects. Decision makers appear to judge
alternatives relative to what is in front of them, rather than what could be.
One circumstance in which such effects arise is when goods are comparable along
several distinct attributes. For example, computers can be compared in terms of
memory and processor speed; televisions can be compared in terms of size and picture
quality; cars can be compared in terms of gas mileage and cargo space. It is easy
to determine which computer has a faster processor, or which television is bigger, or
which car gets better gas mileage. What is difficult, however, is determining how
much of one attribute to trade off for improvement in another. This difficulty is the
essence of the effects studied in this paper; experimentally, it is observed that decision
makers are influenced in their decision of how to trade off between attributes by the
1The effects studied in this paper were first identified by Huber et al. (1982) and Simonson (1989).
1
2presence of information the standard model considers extraneous.
The notable examples of this phenomenon considered herein are the compromise
and attraction effects, which are best explained by example. Consider a decision
maker planning to purchase a laptop, choosing between laptop x, with a 2.5 GHz
processor and 4 GBs of RAM; laptop y, with a 2 GHz processor and 6 GBs of RAM;
and laptop z, with a 1.8 GHz processor and 8 GBs of RAM. The compromise effect
is when agents choose x out of the menu {x,y}, and y, but not x, from the menu{x,y,z}. That is, the presence of laptop z switches their choice from x to y, in
violation of WARP, because the presence of z as a “more extreme” option makes y
appear to be a desirable “compromise.”
s
v
s
s
v
s
The Compromise Effect The Attraction Effect
GHz GHz
RAM RAM
x
y
z
x
y
z
Figure 1⋅1: Graphical illustration of the effects
The “attraction effect” is similar. Suppose instead that laptop z represents a
machine with a 1.8 GHz processor, but only 5 GBs of RAM. Some agents switch from
choosing x out of {x,y} to choosing y out of {x,y,z}. z is no longer “extreme” and
making y a “compromise;” it is, however, clearly dominated on both attributes by y
and only y, thereby making y seem more “attractive” as an easy choice. Notice that
in Figure 1⋅1, the only difference between the effects is the horizontal position of z.
In this example, decision makers must compare the marginal improvements of
3moving from a 2 GHz to a 2.5 GHz processor, or from 4 GBs of RAM to 6. The effects
suggest that they draw inferences about how to judge these marginal improvements
from the context created by the rest of the menu. One possible explanation for these
phenomena is that this context is established by the worst good along each attribute.
Suppose the slowest processor speed establishes a “baseline” which all other pro-
cessors are compared to, and the marginal utility of processing speed decreases mov-
ing further from the baseline. This is an idea introduced by Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) in the context of loss aversion, which they call “diminishing sensitivity.” In
this case, the gain in moving from a 2 GHz processor to a 2.5 GHz processor would
seem larger when the slowest processor is 2 GHz than it would in the presence of
a 1.8 GHz processor. Intriguingly, both the compromise and attraction effects are
consistent with this conceptualization.
This is the framework I will use. Rn is a set of goods2; the n dimensions represent
n separate rankings over these goods. Each of these rankings is derived from an
attribute along which goods are easily compared, such as memory or gas mileage.
Decision makers make a choice from a subset of goods, which I will refer to as a
“menu.” There is a context created by this menu; following the example of Rubinstein
and Salant (2008), I will call this context the “frame,”3 and consider choice behavior
which is standard for any fixed frame, but may demonstrate unusual effects when
the frame is changed. More formally, there is a function mapping menus to frames,
and when comparing choices from menus with the same frame, the decision makers’
choices satisfy WARP. When comparing menus with different frames, WARP may be
violated
The “baseline” interpretation illustrated in the laptop example naturally leads to
2In the body of the paper, I consider the preferences over R2; I expand the model to consider Rn
in Appendix A.1.
3This could also be called a “reference;” it fits naturally with the literature on reference depen-
dence.
4a definition of the frame as the worst value for each attribute among goods in the
menu (i.e., in the laptop example, it would be (1.8 GHz, 4 GB RAM) once laptop z is
included). One attractive feature of this notion of frames is that the compromise and
attraction effects both arise from the same source. Consider the following example:
f ′
s
s s
x
y
zsz′sf
sw
fˆ s
ss
fˆ ′
Figure 1⋅2: The compromise and attraction effects both create the
same frame movement
Consider a choice correspondence C(⋅) such that C({x,y}) = {x,y}. The compro-
mise effect implies C({x,y,z}) = {y}. The attraction effect implies C({x,y,z′}) ={y}. In both cases, the frame is lowered from f to f ′, and this change in frame is what
changes the choice. The immediate observation is that lowering the frame makes y
more appealing relative to x.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude lowering the frame makes x less
appealing relative to all other goods. When adding z to the menu {w,x}, it is still
the case that the frame is lowered; however, now this causes x to be chosen over w.
In other words, compromise and attraction effects are consistent with a lowering of
the frame making x less appealing relative to goods to its right, and more appealing
relative to goods to its left.
This relationship is clearer when translated into terms of preferences. The as-
sumption that WARP holds when the frame is held constant implies the existence of
5a collection of complete and transitive preferences indexed by frames. Denote this
collection {≿f}f∈R2 , where ≿f is the preference revealed by choices from menus with
the frame f . In the language of preferences, to say lowering the frame makes x less
appealing relative to goods to its right and more appealing relative to goods to its
left is to say it rotates the indifference curve associated with a given frame’s revealed
preference clockwise as the given frame is lowered. Similar analysis shows that moving
the frame left rotates the curve counterclockwise4.
f ′ f ′
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Figure 1⋅3: Indifference Curve Rotation in Response to Frame
Changes
Thus, this choice of frame definition and description of indifference curve rotation
combine to form a succinct and intuitive description of the compromise and attrac-
tion effects. Furthermore, there is a straightforward mathematical interpretation.
The collection of preferences {≿f}f∈R2 can be represented by a function of the form
U(x, f). The rotation of indifference curves is a change in their slope. The slope of
an indifference curve (holding the frame constant) is5 U1U2 , and the desired rotation
4Consider repeating the analysis from the previous two paragraphs by adding w to the menu{x,y}.
5Where Ui ≡ ∂U∂i , i.e., the partial derivative of U with respect to the ith argument.
6with regard to the frame is equivalent to:
∂
∂3
U1
U2
> 0
∂
∂4
U1
U2
< 0
It will be shown that this is equivalent to U13U23 > U1U2 > U14U24 , a property I will call
Compromise/Attraction Rotation. I will show in the body of the paper this is closely
related to the notion of “diminishing sensitivity.”
The compromise and attraction effects only arise in choices from menus of three
or more goods. As such, I will assume that the preference revealed by choices from
menus containing only two goods, hereafter referred to as the “pairwise preference,”
is complete on R2, transitive, and continuous. In addition to limiting the departures
from the standard model to the behavior of interest, this provides structure for the
frame preferences revealed by larger menus. An inherent limitation of the frame
preference notion is that each ≿f is complete only over a subset of R2; certain goods
cannot be in a set with frame f . It is difficult to impose regularity on how preferences
change with respect to the frame when there are certain goods over which preferences
are only defined for one frame and not the other. By generating a preference over
all of R2 from the frame preferences, this assumption allows for desired regularity,
namely monotonicity and continuity in the frame.
After a brief literature review in Section 1.2, the paper proceeds in Section 1.3.1 by
taking the choice function and space of goods as a primitive, then deriving the frame
preferences in Section 1.3.2. From there, Section 1.3.3 enumerates a list of prop-
erties for the utility function representation of the collection of frame preferences,
followed by the equivalent behavioral axioms in Section 1.3.4. A representation the-
orem is proven in Section 1.3.5, followed by a discussion of the frame definition in
Section 1.3.6.
71.2 Literature Review
The attraction effect was first demonstrated experimentally by Huber et al. (1982),
and the compromise effect was demonstrated first by Simonson (1989), whose paper
also provided support for the attraction effect. These papers are strictly concerned
with observing the effects; neither of them construct a representation incorporating
these effects. An early model is Simonson and Tversky (1993), which (unlike mine)
depends on context created by all elements in a menu, not just the worst along
each attribute. Kivetz et al. (2004) analyze the Simonson and Tversky model, and
two others, in terms of which best fit available experimental data. These papers
propose several representations which demonstrate the effects; however, there is no
axiomatization for any of these models, so their full behavioral implications remain
unknown.
Ravid (2015) introduces a random choice procedure which allows for both effects.
He shows this procedure can approximate a deterministic choice model if the de-
terministic model is equivalent to Simonson and Tversky (1993); it too depends on
context created by all elements in a menu.
Ok et al. (2015) develop an axiomatized model which incorporates the attraction
effect. Unlike my model, they endogenize the choice of reference (or frame). By
construction, their model cannot represent the compromise effect. They have an
axiom called “Reference Coherence” which essentially constructs a world where a
good which “helps” another good in one context can never “harm” it in another
context. However, the compromise effect helps a given good relative to some goods,
but harms it relative to others. When z is down and to the right of x, goods to x’s
right, between it and z, appear to be compromises, and z can make them preferred
over x; i.e., z harms x relative to those goods. But x is between z and goods to
the left of x, so compared to those goods, x is the compromise, and z can make x
8preferred over goods to its left; i.e., z helps x relative to those goods.
Barbos (2010) also gives a representation theorem admitting the attraction effect
but not the compromise effect. In that paper, goods are divided into exogenous
categories, and the attraction effect privileges goods which have an inferior good
within their category. Again, there isn’t a clear way to fit the compromise effect into
this framework.
The first paper that axiomatizes a choice representation which incorporates both
the attraction and compromise effects is de Clippel and Eliaz (2012). They construct
a representation based around a multiple selves bargaining game, where the ranking
of a good along each attribute represents its attractiveness to a given self. In this
representation, if the menu contains a good which neither self views as the worst
option, it will be selected. This violates continuity, as illustrated in the example
pictured:
qx qyn
  	 qzq
y
Figure 1⋅4: Violation of continuity in de Clippel Eliaz
If there is a sequence of goods converging to good y as pictured, every good in the
sequence will be the sole choice out of a menu with x and z, but y will not be chosen
out of the menu {x,y,z}. Furthermore, they require indifference between any x and
z as depicted (neither dominant on both attributes), so there are no circumstances
where adding an irrelevant alternative may switch a choice entirely from exclusively
choosing one good to exclusively choosing a different good. My model has continuity,
9and allows for such switches.
The paper most closely related to the present work is Tserenjigmid (2015)6. While
independently conceived and executed, both papers consider representations of choice
behavior in which diminishing sensitivity generates both the compromise and attrac-
tion effects. The representations differ in that he characterizes the more specific func-
tional form g(u(x1) − u(f1)) + g(w(x2) −w(f2)), with the frame of reference defined
as it is in this paper, whereas I characterize a more general class of representations.
Also, I show how to expand the set of goods considered from R2 to Rn, an extension
Tserenjigmid also notes is feasible for his representation.
The additively separable form of the representation is useful and tractable; it is
employed by Poterack and Solow (2015) to study electoral politics. Tserenjigmid uses
two axioms for this structure: the Thomsen condition and a translation invariance
condition. In addition to generating the convenient functional form, these axioms
also rule out some preference profiles that are potentially of interest. The Thomsen
condition applies to all preferences revealed by choices, even those revealed by choices
from two-good menus which cannot display either compromise or attraction effects.
The translation invariance condition places restrictions on the magnitude of the ef-
fects as the menu is translated in good space. This poses difficulty for applications
which wish to consider menu effects whose magnitudes vary in the good space. For
example, in the earlier given description of a decision maker purchasing a laptop,
the compromise and attraction effects seem very plausible. However, if this decision
maker were instead considering various options for a network of servers costing hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, the decision would presumably be much more carefully
considered and thus less influenced by these effects. Because the additively separable
form allows for no interaction between the components of the frame, it is not well
suited for modeling both kinds of decisions.
6The first draft of this paper was made available in 2014.
10
The general concept of choice influenced by a frame is related to a class of models
explored by Rubinstein and Salant (2008). Rubinstein and Salant consider choice
functions which take both the menu and a frame as arguments; despite my empha-
sis on frames, the choice correspondence in this paper only takes the menu as an
argument, because the frame is a function of the menu.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Primitives
R2 represents a set of goods7. The two components of an element of R2 represent two
“attributes” which are easily compared (e.g., RAM and processor speed).
The decision maker has a choice correspondence C ∶ S → S, where S is the collec-
tion of all proper compact8 subsets of R2. For simplicity, assume that a good with a
larger number in one component is preferred along the represented attribute. Math-
ematically, if x−i = y−i, then x ∈ C({x,y}) if and only if xi ≥ yi. Define the attribute
preferences ≿1 and ≿2 by x ≻i y if and only if xi ≥ yi. These preferences are complete
and transitive9.
1.3.2 Frames, Revealed Preferences, and fWARP
The choice correspondence C(⋅) can be used to construct a collection of revealed
frame preferences. First, the concept of a “frame” on a menu must be defined.
Define “frame of S” (f(S)) by10
f(S) ≡ (min
x∈S x1,minx∈S x2) (1.3.1)
7The model can be extended to Rn; details are found in appendix A.1.
8Compactness is used solely for the sake of a well-defined minimum.
9Monotonicity in the components can be relaxed; see appendix A.2.
10This definition of frame is very specific, but it will be shown in Section 1.3.6 that it can be
relaxed.
11
Define a revealed frame preference, ≿f by
x ≿f y⇔ ∃ S ∈ S s.t. x,y ∈ S, f(S) = f , and x ∈ C(S) (1.3.2)
Note that by the definition of f(S), ≿f can only be defined for x,y ∈ Af , where
Af ≡ {x ∈ R2∣x1 ≥ f1, x2 ≥ f2} (where f = (f1, f2)).
There exists an ≿f for each f ∈ R2. Collectively, they are {≿f}f∈R2 .
Obviously, to study the compromise and attraction effects, WARP must be weak-
ened. However, some regularity is still desired. It is given by the following axiom:
Axiom 1 (The Weak Axiom of Revealed Frame Preference (fWARP)). If for some
S ∈ S with x,y ∈ S, x ∈ C(S), then for any S′ ∈ S with x,y ∈ S′ and f(S) = f(S′),
y ∈ C(S′) implies x ∈ C(S′).
This axiom is identical to standard WARP, save for the inclusion of the additional
condition “f(S) = f(S′).” This reflects the underlying idea the model: within a frame,
preferences behave as expected. When the frame changes, the preferences do as well.
fWARP implies that {≿f}f∈R2 represents C(⋅) in the sense that
C(S) = {x ∈ S∣x ≿f(S) y ∀ y ∈ S} (1.3.3)
In light of this, I work with the frame preferences henceforth.
1.3.3 Properties
We will begin by considering the properties desirable in such a function. Firstly,
properties to ensure tractability of the utility function are desired. Specifically, it
should be monotone in the first two arguments, and continuous in all four arguments.
Given that goods are assumed to be increasing in desirability in their components,
the function must be strictly increasing in the first two arguments. No monotonicity
12
restriction is placed on the third and fourth arguments because how the utility varies
with f , holding x constant, has no behavioral implications and is therefore irrelevant
to the paper.; the relevant issue is how the relative values of the utilities for various
goods change. The behavior of the representation with regard to the frame is entirely
a statement about the behavior of the collection of preferences: the change when
moving from ≿f to ≿f ′ .
Property 1 (Regularity). U is strictly increasing in the first two arguments and
continuous in all four arguments.
Next is the property which gives the compromise and attraction effects, via the
indifference curve rotation described in the introduction.
Property 2 (Compromise/Attraction Rotation). 11 U13U23 > U1U2 > U14U24
This is the property which most captures the nature of the effects. It is equivalent
to the indifference curves rotating clockwise when the frame is lowered, and counter-
clockwise as it is moved left. Consider the following example: We would expect, by
s
f
≿f≿f ′
s
f ′
s
s s
x
y
z
sw
Figure 1⋅5: Indifference Curve Rotation in Response to Frame
Changes
the compromise effect, the addition of z to the menu {w,x,y} to make y preferred
11The construction of this property suggests difficulty when derivatives are equal to zero or non-
existent; this property can be expressed more generally to encompass these cases. Details can be
found in the proof of the representation theorem.
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to x, but it would also make x preferred to w. This corresponds to the clockwise
rotation of indifference curves, in response to the frame being lowered from f to f ′.
Similarly, the addition of w to the menu {x,y,z} would make x preferred to y and
y preferred to z. That corresponds to the counterclockwise rotation of indifference
curves as the frame is moved left. Again, by the definition of frame used, this will
also capture the attraction effect.
This is closely related to the property of “diminishing sensitivity,” described by
Tversky and Kahneman (1991). This property stipulates that the marginal value
of a gain diminishes as it is further from the reference (or in this case, the frame).
When the frame is lowered, the goods being compared are further from it. This
means that a given advantage in the vertical attribute now has a lower value, and so
a greater advantage is required to make up for a given disadvantage in the horizontal
attribute—hence, the indifference curve must be steeper, which is achieved by its
clockwise rotation. The same applies along the horizontal attribute when the frame
is shifted left.
Finally, there are two more technical properties used for mathematical conve-
nience. One guarantees transitivity among comparisons of pairs of elements; the
other ensures that indifference curves cannot asymptote.
Property 3 (Pairwise Transitivity). U(x1, x2, x1, y2) = U(y1, y2, x1, y2)
& U(y1, y2, y1, z2) = U(z1, z2, y1, z2)⇒ U(x1, x2, x1, z2) = U(z1, z2, x1, z2)12
Property 4 (Non-asymptotic Indifference Curves). Given a frame f , for each x ∈ Af
there exists a y ∈ Af such that
U(x1, x2, f1, f2) = U(f1, y2, f1, f2) = U(y1, f2, f1, f2)
12This property exists to make Axiom 6, Pairwise Weak Order, necessary. If removed, Pairwise
Weak Order is no longer necessary, but the rest of the axioms remain necessary, and Pairwise Weak
Order remains sufficient.
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1.3.4 Axioms
The crux of the idea is that preferences behave as usual when holding the frame fixed.
As such, the first axiom says exactly that.
Axiom 1 (Continuous Weak Order). ≿f is complete on Af , transitive, and continuous,∀ f ∈ R2.
There are two more axioms which apply within a fixed frame, and do not consider
moving the frame.
Axiom 2 (Simplicity). x ≿1 y and x ≿2 y⇒ x ≿f y for all f such that x,y ∈ Af .
This is meant to capture the idea that choice is only difficult when the two at-
tribute preferences disagree. If x is preferred to y on both attributes, it is always
preferred to y, regardless of context. It is equivalent to U being strictly increasing in
the first two arguments.
Axiom 3 (Substitutability). Given y, f such that y ∈ Af , ∃ x s.t. x1 = f1 and y ∼f x,
and z s.t. z2 = f2 and z ∼f y.
This merely prevents asymptotic indifference curves; it is included for technical
reasons, though it also captures the intuition that it’s always possible to trade off
between attributes. It is equivalent to Property 4.
The next axiom is the first to address how preferences change when the frame
is moved. It is equivalent to Property 2; as such, it is my formal statement of the
compromise and attraction effects:
Axiom 4 (Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity). Given x ∼f y and x ≻i y, then
1. y ≻(f−i,f ′i) x ∀ f ′i < fi,
2. x ≻(f−i,f ′′i ) y ∀ f ′′i ∈ (fi, yi],
3. x ≻(f ′−i,fi) y ∀ f ′−i < f−i, and
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Figure 1⋅6: Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity, illustrated
4. y ≻(f ′′−i,fi) x ∀f ′′−i ∈ (f−i, x−i].
A good which only lowers the frame cannot make x appear as a compromise
relative to y, nor be in position for the attraction effect to hold. Therefore, lowering
the frame advantages y. Similarly, a good which only moves the frame left cannot
make y appear as a compromise relative to x, nor be in position for the attraction
effect to hold. Therefore, moving the frame left advantages x.
The next axiom is a continuity axiom related to the behavior of the preferences as
the frame changes. The same intuition which makes continuous preferences appealing
also makes a continuity in how the preferences change with respect to the frame
appealing. A small change in the frame should not make a sudden jump in the
preferences. This intuition is captured by the following axiom:
Axiom 5 (Frame Continuity). Given f , x,y such that x ≻f y, and f ′i such that
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y ≻(f−i,f ′i) x, then ∃ f ′′i such that x ∼(f−i,f ′′i ) y.
As continuous preferences allow for continuous utility functions, Frame Continuity
is a necessary condition for the representation to be continuous in f . However, it is
not a sufficient condition to guarantee continuity in f , because each frame preference
is incomplete on R2, and this creates issues with the behavior of the function as f
changes. Given f ≠ f ′, Af ≠ Af ′ , and the preferences over goods contained in one set
but not the other may behave strangely. Axioms 4 and 5 restrict how preferences may
change when the frame moves, but they do not affect goods in (Af ∪Af ′)∖ (Af ∩Af ′),
because these goods do not see preferences over them change; they see preferences
over them being newly revealed. To put order on this process of preference revelation,
I use an axiom which imposes the earlier stated desire to treat choices from menus
of two goods as complete, transitive, and continuous – Pairwise Weak Order. This
axiom requires the “pairwise revealed preference” ≿∗, defined by the following:
x ≿∗ y⇔ x ∈ C({x,y})
Note that x ≿∗ y⇔ x ≿f({x,y}) y, so the completeness of the frame preferences implies
the completeness of ≿∗.
Axiom 6 (Pairwise Weak Order). ≿∗ is transitive and continuous.
This creates a preference which applies to the whole space, yet also relates the
frames to one another, providing more structure to regulate the behavior of the pref-
erences when moving the frame. Along with Frame Continuity, Pairwise Weak Order
is sufficient to guarantee continuity in f , though it is not necessary for continuity in
f ; this axiom also implies Property 3.
1.3.5 Representation Theorem
Theorem 1 (Compromise/Attraction Representation Theorem). Given a collection
of preferences {≿f}f∈R2 , there exists a function U(x, f) with Properties 1-4 representing
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it if and only if Axioms 1-6 hold.
Finding a utility function conditional on the frame is trivial; in fact, the first
axiom alone guarantees the existence of one. Given a frame f , by Continuous Weak
Order, there exists uf(x) which represents the f -preference over Af . Repeat this for
each f ∈ R2, and define U(x, f) = uf(x). Of course, this axiom alone does not deliver
the other desired properties, namely continuity in f , and therein lies the difficulty.
Proof. The proof first proposes a representation, then establishes some monotonicity
and continuity properties of the representation in f . Given a good x and a frame f
such that x ∈ Af , by Substitutability, there exists a good a(x) whose vertical position
is f2 such that x ∼f a. By Simplicity and transitivity of ≿f , this a is unique. Define a
function v1(x, f) by x ∼f (v1(x, f), f2). v1(x, f) is a representation of {≿f}f∈R2 . To see
this, consider an x′ such that x ≻f x′, x ∼f (v1(x, f), f2) and x′ ∼f (v1(x′, f), f2), so
by transitivity of ≿f , (v1(x, f), f2) ≻f (v1(x′, f), f2). Simplicity then implies v1(x, f) >
v1(x′, f).
rx
rx′
r
f = (f1, f2) ra = (v1(x, f), f2)
v1(x, f)
rb = (f1, v2(x, f))
r
a′ = (v1(x′, f), f2)
v1(x′, f)
rb′
≿f
Figure 1⋅7: Illustration of v1(x, f) and v2(x, f)
By Simplicity, xi > x′i and x−i = x′−i implies x ≻f x′ for each f such that x,x′ ∈ Af .
Therefore, v1 is strictly increasing in x1 and x2.
By continuity of ≿f , v1 is continuous in x1 and x2. To see why, consider {xn}→ x.
Without loss of generality, suppose {xn} is weakly decreasing in both components.
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v1(x, f) ≤ v1(xn, f), for each n. Therefore,infn{v1(xn, f)} ≥ v1(x, f). If the inequality
is strict, there exists y1 ∈ (v1(x, f), infn{v1(xn, f)}). {xn} is in the upper contour set
of (y1, f2) for each n, but x is not in this upper contour set. This violates Continuous
Weak Order, and therefore it must be the case that infn{v1(xn, f)} = v1(x, f). This
implies v1(xn, f)→ v1(x, f), and thus the function is continuous in x1 and x2.
Importantly, v1 is also continuous in f1.
Lemma 1. Given axioms 1-5, v1 is continuous in f1.
Proof. Consider {fn1 }∞n=1 → f1. Without loss of generality, suppose {fn1 }∞n=1 is in-
creasing13. v1 is decreasing in f1. By Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity, moving
the frame right rotates the indifference curves clockwise. Therefore, given f ′1 > f1,
f ≡ (f1, f2), and f ′ ≡ (f ′1, f2), (v1(x, f), f2) ≻f ′ (v1(x, f ′), f2). This implies v1(x, f) >
v1(x, f ′), which implies v1 is decreasing in f1. Because {fn1 }∞n=1 is increasing, v1(x, f) ≤
v1(x, fn) ∀ n ∈ N. As {v1(x, fn)} is bounded from below, there exists infn{v1(x, fn)},
and v1(x, f) ≤ infn{v1(x, fn)}.
rf
f1 v1(x, f)
r
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. . .
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Figure 1⋅8: Discontinuity of v1(x, f) Creates a Contradiction
Suppose v1(x, f) < infn{v1(x, fn)}, as illustrated in the above picture. There
exists a y such that y2 = f2 and y1 ∈ (v1(x, f), infn{v1(x, fn)}). y ≻f x, but x ≻(f ′1,f2) y
13Because {fn1 }∞n=1 → f1 is a sequence in R, there exists a monotone subsequence which converges
to f1.
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∀ f ′1 < f1. Furthermore, by Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity, y ≻f x ∀ f ′1 > f1.
Therefore, there is no fˆ1 such that x ∼(fˆ1,f2) y, and this violates Frame Continuity.
Thus, v1(x, f) = inf{v1(x, fn)}, it is the limit of {v1(x, fn)}, and this implies v1 is
continuous in f1.
Symmetric reasoning shows that there is also a function v2(x, f) defined by x ∼f(f1, v2(x, f)). v2 is strictly increasing and continuous in x1 and x2, and continuous in
f2. So now there are two representations, v1 and v2. v1 has the desired continuity in
f1, and v2 has the desired continuity in f2. The next step is to show these functions
have the desired continuity in both arguments.
Lemma 2. Given v1 as defined above, which is continuous in f1, and v2 as defined
above, which is continuous in f2, Pairwise Weak Order implies v1 and v2 are both
continuous in both f1 and f2.
Proof. Consider the points (v1(x, f), f2) ≡ a and (f1, v2(x, f)) ≡ b. Both of these
points are f -indifferent to x, which, by transitivity of ≿f , means a ∼f b. Because14
f ({a,b}) = f , this means that C ({a,b}) = {a,b}, and thus the two points are
pairwise indifferent, a ∼∗ b.≿∗ is continuous and transitive, and is complete by completeness of the f -preferences.
Therefore, there exists a continuous function u∗(⋅, ⋅) which represents the pairwise
preference. Thus,
u∗(a) = u∗(b)
u∗ (v1(x, f), f2) = u∗ (f1, v2(x, f))
u∗(⋅, ⋅) can be used to demonstrate that v1 is continuous in f2. Consider {fn2 }∞n=1 →
f2. v2 is continuous in f2, so {v2(x, fn)}∞n=1 → v2(x, f) (where fn ≡ (f1, fn2 )). There-
fore, continuity of u∗ implies {u∗ (f1, v2(x, fn))}∞n=1 → u∗ (f1, v2(x, f)). For each n,
u∗ (v1(x, fn), fn2 ) = u∗ (f1, v2(x, fn)), and u∗(f1, v2(x, f)) = u∗(v1(x, f), f2). This
implies that {u∗ (v1(x, fn), fn2 )}∞n=1 → u∗ (v1(x, f), f2). Furthermore, by Simplicity,
u∗(⋅, ⋅) is strictly increasing in both arguments. Thus, in addition to being continuous
in f1, v1 is continuous in f2. The same proof can show that v2 is continuous in f1.
14This equality is essential to the proof of this lemma, and will be important in Section 1.3.6,
when other frame definitions are discussed.
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Figure 1⋅9: Pairwise Continuity Makes v1 and v2 continuous in all
arguments
There are two functions which satisfy the continuity property required; they each
define the function U(x, f) by
U(x, f) = u∗ (v1(x, f), f2)= u∗ (f1, v2(x, f))
In other words, the weak order of the pairwise preference “ties together” the v1
and v2 functions.
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Figure 1⋅10: Pairwise Continuity Unites v1 and v2
The preceding establishes that U satisfies Property 1. U satisfies Property 2
because this property is equivalent to Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity. Take
a frame f and a point x ∈ Af . Consider the points “left” of x (i.e., those points
with smaller first components) which x is f -indifferent to. If f is lowered to some f ′
with f ′2 < f2 and f ′1 = f1, by Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity, x is f ′-preferred
to these points above it. Now consider the points “right” of x (with a larger first
component) which x is f -indifferent to. x is f ′-dispreferred to these points. In other
words, the indifference curve passing through x gets steeper with the move to f ′. If
instead f is moved left to some f ′ with f ′1 < f1 and f ′2 = f2, the opposite happens, and
the indifference curve gets shallower.
The monotonicity axiom, therefore, can be expressed as a condition on how the
slopes of the indifference curves change with respect to changes in f . The slope of
the indifference curve is the marginal rate of attribute substitution (MRAS); define
the function MRASx(f1, f2) as the slope of the f indifference curve at point x15.
Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity is therefore equivalent to:
15This does assume that the indifference curve has a slope at point x; however, note that by Sim-
plicity, the indifference curves are monotonic. Therefore, they are differentiable almost everywhere.
For points in the measure zero set which have no derivative, left and right derivatives can be taken
to establish the property.
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Figure 1⋅11: The Relationship Between Compromise/Attraction
Monotonicity and Indifference Curve Slopes
∂
∂f1
MRASx(f1, f2) > 0
∂
∂f2
MRASx(f1, f2) < 0
The MRAS is equal to the ratio of the marginal utilities, so MRASx(f1, f2) =
U1(x1,x2,f1,f2)
U2(x1,x2,f1,f2) . Taking these derivatives shows that U13U2 −U1U23 > 0 > U14U2 −U1U24,
which is equivalent to Property 216:
U13
U23
> U1
U2
> U14
U24
Transitivity of the pairwise preference is equivalent to Property 3:
U(x1, x2, x1, y2) = U(y1, y2, x1, y2)
U(y1, y2, y1, z2) = U(z1, z2, y1, z2) }⇒ U(x1, x2, x1, z2) = U(z1, z2, x1, z2)
Finally, Substitutability is equivalent to Property 4. Given a frame f , for each
x ∈ Af there exists a y ∈ Af such that
U(x1, x2, f1, f2) = U(f1, y2, f1, f2) = U(y1, f2, f1, f2)
16Assuming U23 and U24 are not equal to zero; if they are, consider Property 2 to be the non-
reduced form.
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This then concludes the proof that a representation satisfying properties 1-4 exists
if Axioms 1-6 are satisfied; it remains to be shown that if the representation exists,
it satisfies the axioms.
Given a representation U(x, f), the usual argument implies Continuous Weak
Order. Being strictly increasing in x1 and x2 implies Simplicity. Property 4 implies
Substitutability. Property 3 implies Pairwise Transitivity, and Property 2 implies
Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity. These are all trivial. The remaining axioms
(Frame Continuity and Pairwise Continuity) require more sophisticated arguments.
Consider {(yn)}∞n=1 → (y), where x ∼∗ (yn) for each n. Pairwise Continuity is im-
plied if x ∼∗ (y1, y2). By the continuity of U , U(x1, x2, x1, yn2 )→ U(x1, x2, x1, y2) (As-
suming, without loss of generality, that x ≻2 y). Also by continuity, U(yn1 , yn2 , x1, yn2 )→
U(y1, y2, x1, y2)17. However, U(x1, x2, x1, yn2 ) = U(yn1 , yn2 , x1, yn2 ) ∀ n. This implies that
U(x1, x2, x1, y2) = U(y1, y2, x1, y2), as desired.
As for Frame Continuity, consider, x,y, f such that x ≻f y, and f ′i such that
y ≻(f−i,f ′i) x. Suppose there does not exist an f ′′i such that x ∼(f−i,f ′′i ) y. In other
words, while there is no fi which makes x ∼f y, there are fi’s which make it both pre-
ferred and dispreferred. So as fi is lowered and the indifference curve rotates through
x as per Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity, there is a gap in the area covered by
the indifference curves, and y resides in this gap.
This case is straightforwardly ruled out by the continuity of U . If such a gap
17This does require U to be jointly continuous in all arguments; it can be seen that this is
implied by the continuity in each individual argument as follows: to show {(xn1 , xn2 , fn1 , fn2 )}∞n=1 →(x1, x2, f1, f2) ⇒ {U(xn1 , xn2 , fn1 , fn2 )}∞n=1 → U(x1, x2, f1, f2), break up the convergent sequence into{xn1}∞n=1 → x1, {xn2}∞n=1 → x2, {fn1 }∞n=1 → f1, and {fn2 }∞n=1 → f2. With these constituent parts, we
can see:
∃ N1 s.t. ∀ n1 > N1, ∣w(x1, x2, f1, fn12 ) −w(x1, x2, f1, f2)∣ < ε4∃ N2 s.t. ∀ n2 > N2, ∣w(x1, x2, fn21 , fn12 ) −w(x1, x2, f1, fn12 )∣ < ε4∃ N3 s.t. ∀ n3 > N3, ∣w(x1, xn32 , fn21 , fn12 ) −w(x1, x2, fn21 , fn12 )∣ < ε4∃ N4 s.t. ∀ n4 > N4, ∣w(xn41 , xn32 , fn21 , fn12 ) −w(x1, xn32 , fn21 , fn11 )∣ < ε4
By the ∆-inequality, ∣w(xn41 , xn32 , fn21 , fn12 ) − w(x1, x2, f1, f2)∣ ≤ ∣w(xn41 , xn32 , fn21 , fn12 ) −
w(x1, xn32 , fn21 , fn12 )∣ + ∣w(x1, xn32 , fn21 , fn12 ) − w(x1, x2, fn21 , fn12 )∣ + ∣w(x1, x2, fn21 , fn12 ) −
w(x1, x2, f1, fn12 )∣+ ∣w(x1, x2, f1, fn12 )−w(x1, x2, f1, f2)∣. If we choose ni > max{N1,N2,N3,N4} ∀ i ∈{1,2,3,4}, then the RHS of the above inequality is < ε
4
+ ε
4
+ ε
4
+ ε
4
= ε.
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Figure 1⋅12: Absence of Frame Continuity Creates a Contradiction
exists, there exists {fni }∞n=1 → fˆi such the following two statements hold:
U(x1, x2, f−i, fni ) > U(y1, y2, f−i, fni ) ∀ n (1.3.4)
U(x1, x2, f−i, fˆi) < U(y1, y2, f−i, fˆi) (1.3.5)
However, by the continuity of U ,
lim
n→∞U(x1, x2, f−i, fni ) = U(x1, x2, f−i, fˆi) (1.3.6)
lim
n→∞U(y1, y2, f−i, fni ) = U(y1, y2, f−i, fˆi) (1.3.7)
This contradicts (1.3.4) and (1.3.5), and therefore such a gap cannot exist.
1.3.6 Alternate Frame Definitions
Up to this point, I have used a very specific definition of the frame. However, my
representation theorem is robust to a variety of approaches to defining the frame. This
is useful because there are examples where the most appropriate frame definition is
not obvious, such as Figure 1⋅13.
z is dominated on both attributes by both x and y. As the attraction effect is
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Figure 1⋅13: Three Good Menu Motivating Alternate Frame Defini-
tion
normally described in an example where the third good is only dominated by one
other good, and thereby induces the choice of that good, it is unclear what the effect
of z should be in this situation. The definition of the frame used up until this point
suggests that it may induce a different choice, though which choice is unclear as it
affects both goods. This seems plausible. One could also argue that a decision maker
would completely ignore z, and only focus on x and y, and therefore it should have
no impact. This also seems plausible. Frame Preferences are robust to the following
definition of frame that adopts this latter interpretation of behavior:
Define Sˆ ≡ {x ∈ S ∣ ∃ y ∈ S, i ∈ {1,2} such that x ≻i y}
f(S) ≡ (min
x∈Sˆ x1,minx∈Sˆ x2)
This two-step frame definition first winnows the menu by removing all points such as
z in the picture above, which are dominated on both attributes by all other goods.
It then applies the original frame definition to the winnowed menu. A collection of
revealed frame preferences can be constructed using this definition of frame, and the
representation theorem will still hold for this new collection of frame preferences.
In fact, any frame definition and associated collection of revealed frame preferences
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which satisfy the following weak condition will generate a collection of revealed frame
preferences for which the representation theorem holds:
Condition 1 (Pairwise Edge Consistency). Given (v1, f2), (f1, v2) such that (v1, f2) ∼f(f1, v2), f ({(v1, f2), (f1, v2)}) = f .
This works because the proof of the representation theorem only relies on the
definition of the frame in one place. After having established the representations v1
and v2, it is noted that, by transitivity of ≿f , a ≡ (v1(x, f), f2) ∼f (f1, v2(x, f)) ≡ b.
Because18 f({a,b}) = f , this implies a ∼∗ b. That is all the representation theorem
requires of the frame definition; that the menu consisting solely of the two f -indifferent
goods used to identify v1 and v2 also have the frame f , thus guaranteeing their pairwise
indifference.
Indeed, there are many frame definitions which would generate a collection of
preferences with a representation satisfying the given properties. However, many of
these frame definitions would not combine with Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity
to produce an outcome consistent with the compromise and attraction effects. For
example, defining the frame as the maximum along each attribute would allow for
the compromise effect, but not the attraction effect (adding z would shift the frame,
but adding z′ would not).
However, reference dependence abounds, and there may be other effects best illu-
minated through other frame definitions. Combining a frame definition and associated
collection of frame preferences which satisfy Pairwise Edge Consistency with Pairwise
Weak Order can be used as a basis for creating a utility function which is continuous
in the frame. Specifically, if the behavior of the preferences is such that there exist
representations vi along the edge of the frame as defined in the proof, and each vi
is continuous in fi, then Pairwise Edge Consistency and Pairwise Weak Order make
18By construction, v1(x) > f1, and v2(x) > f2.
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Figure 1⋅14: Failure of Defining Frame by Maximum to Produce At-
traction Effect
those representation functions continuous in all components of f . This is a potentially
useful construct for further study of reference dependence.
1.4 Conclusion
Though the compromise and attraction effects have long been well established ex-
perimentally, there is little available in the way of systematic representations. This
paper offers a fully axiomatized model which incorporates both effects, by embrac-
ing the notion of frame preferences and using them to create a succinct expression
of the effects which has a natural mathematical interpretation, summarized by the
Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity axiom and the Compromise/Attraction Rota-
tion property.
Through its regularity properties, this model is very convenient for applications. It
is natural to consider compromise and attraction effects in an industrial organization
setting, for example in the case of a multi-product monopolist, or a single product
oligopoly game. Ok et al. (2011) do the former, using their model which features
the attraction effect but not the compromise effect. The latter situation remains
unexplored. In both cases, this model would be ideal for exploring optimal strategies
in the presence of both effects.
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The compromise and attraction effects can also be applied to the political realm.
Pan et al. (1995) show evidence of the attraction effect in voting results from the
1992 U.S. presidential election and the 1994 Illinois Democratic gubernatorial pri-
mary. Relatedly, it is a commonly observed phenomenon that many elections feature
extremist candidates with no possibility of winning. While no other papers provide
explanations for this result, Poterack and Solow (2015) use Frame Preferences to do
so.
In addition, this paper makes behavioral predictions which can be tested exper-
imentally. In particular, while papers have studied both compromise and attraction
effects, there has not been an attempt to construct a single experiment which can
show either effect in the same setting. Such an experiment could be used to estimate
the relative magnitudes of the effects, which this paper predicts would be the same.
Also, the effect of adding goods which do not change the frame should be explored;
i.e., it should be tested whether the addition of non-extreme goods can induce either
effect.
Finally, as noted the paper draws a relationship between Pairwise Weak Order
and a representation which is continuous in the frame. As reference dependence is
common, and as constructing a utility which is continuous in the reference is desirable,
this is a potentially useful basis for future papers looking to construct convenient
reference dependent representations.
Chapter 2
Extremist Politics and the Preference for
Compromise*
2.1 Introduction
Violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives) have been extensively documented in choice from menus across many
domains. Two particular violations, the “compromise effect” and the “attraction
effect,” seem to be particularly robust features of behavior. The compromise effect
refers to a tendency of decision-makers to avoid choices that are “extreme” in some
feature in the choice set. The attraction effect can be described as a tendency for
decision-makers to select an option which strictly dominates some other option in the
choice set if no other alternatives satisfy the same dominance relation.
In this paper, we extend the canonical citizen-candidate model to a multi-dimensional
policy space and consider how the presence of voters who are subject to compromise
and attraction effects change incentives for candidate entry. Despite having observed
these effects in many different contexts of choice from menus, the literature has largely
ignored how the presence of these behavioral effects change incentives for optimal
menu construction. In particular, while Pan, et al (1995) documented the presence
of these effects in political contests, the literature has yet to incorporate voter prefer-
ences generating compromise or attraction effects in models of political competition.
*This chapter of the dissertation is based on joint work with Benjamin L. Solow.
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We show that incorporating these preferences generates novel incentives for candidate
behavior and provides a strategic incentive for extremist candidates to run for office
in equilibrium.
We build a tractable model of endogenous entry into plurality elections where
voters act sincerely, but have preferences subject to the compromise and attraction
effects. We model the compromise and attraction effects via “frames of reference” as
in Tserenjigmid (2015) and Poterack (2015). Voters have horizontally differentiated
single-peaked preferences along two dimensions of policy, but different menus of can-
didates on the ballot can generate different frames of reference and thus change how
voters evaluate the policy platforms of the candidates.
Elections are of particular interest in the study of supply-side responses to the
compromise and attraction effects. Candidates can be thought of as single-product
oligopolists competing for market share, but without access to price as an instrument.
Differing from competitive product markets, however, there is a clear menu facing all
consumers in the market which is endogenously determined by strategic behavior.
In many contexts in traditional product market competition, understanding what
menu a consumer actually observes is difficult, yet integral to understanding these
effects. Thus, our model should be understood to provide some insight into the forces
introduced to oligopolistic product markets by these effects while clearly leaving scope
for further work.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we provide a tractable model
of spatial competition in elections with multiple dimensions of policy space. Failures
of canonical models to generalize from single to multi-dimensional policy spaces has
plagued the study of electoral politics. In particular, Plott (1967), Kramer (1973),
McKelvey (1976) and others demonstrated that pure strategy Nash equilibria gener-
ally fail to exist when candidates compete over policy spaces with more than one ide-
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ological dimension. Solutions to this problem have included introducing uncertainty
to voter behavior in order to smooth payoff functions (Roemer 2004), eliminating ei-
ther the spatial structure or single-peakedness assumptions on voter utility functions
(Besley and Coate 1997), or adding candidate-specific valence effects (Ansolabehere
and Snyder 2000). We require neither type of assumption and instead obtain our
results by restricting the degree of commitment available to candidates. This is a
natural assumption that reflects realities of political competition at high levels of
elected office. First, candidates do not, in reality, have commitment technologies
available to them. Second, voters likely have well-formed beliefs about the policies a
(for example, presidential) candidate would implement based on an observed history
of policymaking.1
Second, we show general results on the incentives generated by the compromise
and attraction effects in spatial models. We show, independent of the chosen func-
tional form of the representation, asymmetric effects of extremist entrants on mod-
erate candidates. For symmetric distributions of voter preferences, however, any
particular extremist entrant has an “equal and opposite” extremist who has exactly
countervailing effects on voter preferences over the moderate candidates. For skewed
distributions of voter preferences, this equal and opposite extremist may not exist.
Therefore, we conclude that distance from the mean voter’s preferred policy may be
relatively more important than distance from the median voter’s preferred policy in
multicandidate elections.
Third, we implement a particular functional form of these effects characterized by
Tserenjigmid (2015) and Poterack (2015) and use that form to study Nash equilibria of
1One can think of our game as being a stage of a dynamic game where politicians invest in being
associated with a policy platform early in their career by voting for it when in office. Later, voters
would have more precise views about the candidates’ policy preferences. So long as there is still a
payoff to being associated with this policy after leaving office (e.g. legacy concerns, transitioning to
private lobbying work, etc.), politicians would not deviate in this stage game either.
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an entry game. We show that there exist linear equilibria where extremists enter and
obtain office with probability zero. By entering, however, they positively frame their
preferred moderate candidate, and thus shift the expected policy outcome closer to
their ideal point. This is a novel result in models of spatial competition. All previous
models which generate sure loser equilibria either require them to be centrist with
respect to the competitive candidates in a “squeezing” equilibrium (Osborne and
Slivinski 1996, Solow 2015) or require violations of single-peaked preferences (Besley
and Coate 1997).
2.2 Related Literature
Multidimensional spatial competition has been of great interest historically, especially
in the domain of supply-side behavior in elections. Unfortunately, early work by
Plott (1967), McKelvey (1976) and others demonstrated that in Hotelling-Downs
models of multidimensional competition, pure strategy Nash equilibria generally do
not exist. Despite this, multidimensional competition seems important. Ahler and
Broockman (2016) argues that mapping voters’ preferences to a single dimension can
mischaracterize as moderate voters who hold immoderate views on a number of issues,
but are less correlated in their preferences than parties are.
Theorists have employed a number of strategies to attempt to address the problems
with multidimensional Hotelling-Downs. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) introduce
valence, a vertical differentiation component, to the model and show that valence
issues restore equilibria. In all equilibria, however, the candidate with a greater va-
lence score wins the election with probability one. Mckelvey (1986) utilizes a different
solution technique for the game and shows that the uncovered set contains equilib-
rium behavior under several different institutional structures. Roemer (2004) studies
the Hotelling-Downs model where voters behave probabilistically, which smooths the
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discontinuities in candidate payoff functions which cause Nash equilibria not to exist.
Our results here are complementary. Rather than introduce noise to voter prefer-
ences or change the mode of differentiation, we restrict candidates’ ability to commit
to different policy platforms. As in Osborne and Slivinski (1996), candidates are un-
able to credibly commit to a policy platform different than their most preferred policy.
We show that this lack of commitment technology restores existence of equilibria and
that some of these equilibria address undesirable features of the set of equilibria in
other models. For example, all candidates who choose to enter despite losing with
certainty in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) must be centrist. This is no longer the
case in a multidimensional issue space. Additionally, the multidimensional domain of
competition allows us to study the attraction and compromise effects.
The attraction effect was first demonstrated experimentally in the early 1980’s
by Huber et al. (1982), and the compromise effect was demonstrated first by Itamar
Simonson (1989), whose paper also provided support for the attraction effect. These
papers are strictly concerned with observing the effects; neither of them attempt
to construct a representation incorporating these effects. Some effort to do so is
undertaken by Simonson and Tversky (1993), whose model (unlike ours) depends on
context created by all elements in a menu, not just the worst along each attribute.
Kivetz et al. (2004) analyze the Simonson and Tversky model, and two others, in
terms of which best fit available experimental data.
Recently, there has been renewed interest in applying models of the attraction
and compromise effects to economic questions. In particular, Ok et al. (2015), utilize
their representation of the attraction effect to derive the optimal menu of vertically
differentiated products offered by a multiproduct monopolist in the presence of con-
sumers who exhibit the attraction effect. Our contribution is complementary. We
provide the first, to our knowledge, study of horizontal differentiation in the pres-
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ence of the compromise effect. In addition, our framework is competitive rather than
monopolistic, although we do not study the implications of these effects for pricing.
The most closely related paper to our application here is Pan, et al. (1995). Pan, et
al. argue that experimental subjects exhibit the attraction effect when given menus
of political candidates who have been scored on various issues. The subjects were
randomly assigned to menus where different candidates had an asymmetric dominance
relationship with a third candidate. Despite subjects’ previous familiarity with the
candidates (e.g. presidential candidates), Pan, et al. recover evidence of the attraction
effect in voter choice.
2.3 Model
We begin with the standard continuous citizen-candidate model of Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). In any election, the electorate is comprised of a unit mass of citizensI with single-peaked preferences over policy. Policies are represented by the double(e, s); these two dimensions can be thought of representing, for example, economic
and social policies. The ideal point for citizen i is denoted (ei, si), and the ideal
points of the electorate are distributed over R2 according to an arbitrary distribution
function F . We assume F is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments.
In Section 2.5 we will restrict F to be bounded and have support [0,1] × [0,1].
We also assume there exists a unit mass of potential candidates J with single-
peaked preferences over policy. Potential candidates are also distributed over R2 ac-
cording to continuous, strictly increasing distribution functionG, where support(G) =
support(F ).2 The action set for potential candidate j is denoted Aj = {E, N} where
E represents entering the race, and N represents not entering. Types are common
2We define the set of citizens and candidates separately in order to facilitate the analysis of
Section 2.5. Our results from Section 2.4 would be identical if candidates were also allowed to vote.
Our restriction on the supports is also an analytical convenience and not required to retain the
qualitative properties of our results.
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knowledge, and no commitment technology is available. Since there is a unit mass
of citizens, no single citizen may be pivotable between candidates, and therefore all
citizens vote sincerely. If a potential candidate chooses to enter the race, we call her
a candidate.
Citizens are policy motivated and have no preference over the identity of any
candidate (i.e. there are no valence effects). Potential candidates are also policy
motivated. In addition, those candidates who choose to stand for office incur a utility
cost c of running for office.3 Whichever candidates wins the election obtains office-
related benefits b (e.g. “ego-rents” as in Rogoff 1990). We assume policy motivations
take the form of a linear cost function in the difference between the implemented policy
and a citizen or candidate’s ideal policy. Therefore, if the winner of the election has
ideal policy (ew, sw), citizens and all potential candidates who choose N and have
type τj = (ej, sj), obtain a payoff of
pij(N,σ−j; τj = (ej, sj)) = −((ej − ew)2 + (sj − sw)2) 12
A candidate who chooses to enter the race obtains an additional payoff b in the
event of winning the election, but pays cost c regardless of the outcome. Therefore,
for a candidate with ideal policy (ej, sj), her payoff of choosing E is
pij(E,σ−j; τj = (ej, sj)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
b − c if wins outright
−((ej − ew)2 + (sj − sw)2) 12 − c if loses outright.
Henceforth, we use d(x, y) to denote the Euclidean distance (policy relevant portion
3The cost of running for office is better understood as the net cost of running for office absent
parameters modeled here. If candidates obtained, for example, dynamic career benefits from running,
that would appear in this model as a lower value of c. The assumption we make of equal cost of
running for office, therefore, excludes cases such as term-limited candidates or a mapping from vote
shares to post-electoral influence.
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of payoffs) between x and y. Each potential candidate obtains a payoff of −∞ if no
one chooses to enter. The office-related portion of the payoff function, b, therefore
represents the magnitude of the incentives to run from obtaining office relative to the
incentives to run from the ability to affect policy.
The game is a simultaneous move entry game. Thus, a strategy is a mapping
σj ∶ τj → Aj.. As is typical in citizen-candidate models, we focus on characterizing
pure strategy Nash equilibria by the number of candidates who choose to enter (e.g.
the set of equilibria where two candidates choose to enter the race). An equilibrium
is given by pij(σj, σ−j) ≥ pij(σ′j, σ−j) for all j and σ′j. Let the set of candidates be
given by K = {j ∈ J ∶ σj = E} and let the vector of types for the set of candidates who
have chosen to enter be denoted τK . Denote by vj(τK) the vote share of candidate
j, i.e. the measure of voters who prefer j to all other candidates. We study plurality
elections. Therefore, the set of victors is given by W = {j ∶ vj ≥ vk∀j, k ∈K}.
2.4 Multidimensional Citizen-Candidate
As is traditional in citizen-candidate models, we characterize sets of pure strategy
Nash equilibria by the number of candidates who choose to enter the race. The rel-
ative magnitudes of the set of two candidate equilibria and the sets of multi-party
(three or more) candidate equilibria are of particular interest. Duverger’s (1954) Law,
the statement that plurality rule generates two party systems, seems to hold empir-
ically. Nevertheless, three candidate equilibria do exist in plurality elections in the
unidimensional citizen-candidate model. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) show a form
of Duverger’s Law: for all distributions of voter preferences F , the set of parameters b
and c that support two candidate equilibria under the runoff rule are a subset of those
that support two candidate equilibria under plurality rule. While we do not consider
the runoff rule here, our analysis provides the first set of results necessary to compare
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the two rules in the citizen-candidate model under multidimensional competition.
As is the case in all citizen-candidate models, we face a large multiplicity of equi-
libria. Indeed, the move to multiple dimensions of competition makes this problem
worse, as there are more sets of candidate locations that generate vote shares that
may occur in equilibrium. The first step, therefore, is to attempt to limit the potential
positions that candidates can take in equilibrium. In a single dimension, candidates
who lose with certainty cannot be extreme amongst the set of entrants. This re-
sult is due to the fact that a candidate who is losing with certainty, but extreme
among the set of entrants, either has no effect on the policy implemented or helps her
least preferred alternative candidate win the election. This no longer holds in a two
dimensional model, but the intuition of the result remains.
Lemma 1. There does not exist an equilibrium in which a candidate x loses with
certainty if ∀ i such that arg maxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x, arg maxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) = y for
some y ∈K/{x}.
Lemma 1 formalizes the underlying logic of Lemma 1 in Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and extends it to multiple dimensions. In this multi-dimensional framework
we can see clearly that the restrictions on positions of sure losers in equilibrium is
not really about the relative extremity of candidates, but rather about agreement of
their voters on the next-best alternative.
This is particularly relevant to models of strategic voting with exogenous candi-
dates which often study “divided majority” cases (e.g. Myerson and Weber 1993). In
a divided majority setting with three candidates, a majority of voters prefer either of
candidates A or B to candidate C, but disagree on their ranking of A and B. Our
result suggests that if candidates are policy motivated as well as office motivated, and
agree with their supporters on policy, the assumption of both candidates A and B
choosing to participate in the election is not innocuous.
We wish to characterize the set of multi-candidate equilibria. In order to do so,
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we must first characterize vote shares for entry by arbitrary sets of candidates. As in
McKelvey (1986) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), our voters’ preferences here
are Euclidean. Thus, the set of voters who are indifferent between two candidates x
and y is defined by the perpendicular bisector of the vector τx − τy. Let M denote
the set of all median lines, i.e. all lines that divide F (.) into two regions of equal
mass. Borrowing a term from McKelvey (1986), let the “yolk” of the distribution be
defined as the smallest ball in R2 which intersects all median lines. When specializing
the distribution in later sections, we will return to the importance of the yolk for
existence of different equilibria.
In order to characterize the set of two candidate equilibria, we must know the
vote shares of all configurations with at least three candidates. Suppose there exist
three candidates, x, y, and z, with (ex, sx) = (12 + a, 12 + b), (ey, sy) = (12 + c, 12 + d), and(ez, sz) = (12 + f, 12 + g). Without loss of generality, let b < d. The set of voters who
are indifferent between candidates x and y is given by si = a−cd−bei + 1+d+b2 − a−cd−b (1+a+c2 ),
and therefore the set of voters who prefer x to y are all voters with si ≤ a−cd−bei +
1+d+b
2 − a−cd−b (1+a+c2 ). The set of voters who are indifferent between x and z is given by
si = a−fg−b ei + 1+d+g2 − a−fg−b (1+a+f2 ). Finally, the set of voters who are indifferent between
y and z are given by si = c−fg−dei + 1+d+g2 − c−fg−d (1+c+f2 ).
Candidate i’s voters are given by the set of voters that prefer her to every other
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candidate. If g > d,
νx = {i ∶ si ≤ min{a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
νy = {i ∶ a − c
d − bei + 1 + d + b2 − a − cd − b(1 + a + e2 ) < si ≤
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}
νz = {i ∶ si > max{a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
Similarly, if g < b,
νx = {i ∶ a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ) < si ≤
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
νy = {i ∶ si > max{a − c
d − bei + 1 + d + b2 − a − cd − b(1 + a + e2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
νz = {i ∶ si ≤ min{a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
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Finally, if b < g < d,
νx = {i ∶ si ≤ min{a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
νy = {i ∶ si > max{a − c
d − bei + 1 + d + b2 − a − cd − b(1 + a + e2 ),
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}}
νz = {i ∶ a − f
g − b ei + 1 + b + g2 − a − fg − b (1 + a + f2 ) < si ≤
c − f
g − dei + 1 + d + g2 − c − fg − d(1 + c + f2 )}
Therefore, vote shares vx, vy, and vz are given simply by integrating F (.) over the
subsets of policy space that prefer each candidate.
Consider two candidates, x and y, with ideal policies (ex, sx) and (ey, sy). Without
loss of generality, assume ex < ey and sx < sy. We call an entrant z with ideal policy(ez, sz) extreme with respect to party competition if either τz << τx or τz >> τy. Denote
by d∗(F ) the critical value of d(x, y) such that if d(x, y) > d∗(F ), there exists an
entrant who is not extreme with respect to party competition who can enter and win
the election and if d(x, y) < d∗(F ) no such entrant exists.4
Proposition 1. 1. In any two candidate equilibrium, d(x, y) < d∗(F ) and si =
sx+sy
2 + ex−eysy−sx (ei − ex+ey2 ) is a median line.
2. There exists a two candidate equilibrium with candidates x and y located at(ex, sx) and (ey, sy) if and only if vx = vy = 12 , d(x, y) > 0, b ≥ 2c − d(x, y), for
all i such that vx(x, y, i) > vy(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(y, i) − d(x, i)] and for all i such
that vy(x, y, i) > vx(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(x, i) − d(y, i)], and either d(x, y) < d∗(F ) or
d(x, y) = d∗(F ) and for all i who cause d∗(F ) to bind, b ≤ 3c− 12(d(x, i)+d(y, i)).
Two candidate equilibria share similar features with the unidimensional model.
In particular, the line dividing the two groups of voters must be an element of M .
4Note that given continuity of F (.), d∗(F ) > 0.
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In a single dimension, the candidates must be equidistant from the median voter.
As opposed to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), there cannot exist a two candidate
equilibrium where a candidate wins with certainty. This is not the case with more
than two candidates.
Equilibria with three candidates do exist in plurality elections as well. Notably,
the move to multiple dimensions generates three candidate equilibria where a single
candidate wins the election with certainty. This equilibrium is very similar to an
example given in Besley and Coate (1996). Our contribution is to show that their ex-
ample is a much more robust potential outcome and does not require the violations of
single-peakedness and narrow assumptions on preferences they use. Furthermore, we
identify a constant and undesirable feature of this class of equilibria: all sure winners
in three candidate elections must be Condorcet losers among the set of entrants.
Proposition 2. Let K = {x,L1, L2}. There exists a three candidate equilibrium with
a sure winner, x, and sure losers, L1, L2, if and only if:
1. vx > max{vL1 ; vL2}.
2. ∀ z such that vz = maxk∈K∪{z} vk, b ≤ c − d(x, z).
3. ∀ z such that vLi = maxk∈K∪{z}, c ≥ d(x, z) − d(Li, z).
4. c ≤ min{d(L1, L2) − d(L1, x);d(L1, L2) − d(L2, x)}.
5. x is a Condorcet loser, i.e. vx(x,L1) < vL1(x,L1) and vx(x,L2) < vL2(x,L2).
6. b ≥ c − d(x,L∗), where L∗ = arg maxLi vLi(L1, L2).
Additionally, there exist equilibria where a single candidate loses with certainty.
Here a crucial distinction with respect to unidimensional competition arises. As
Lemma 1 hints, being extreme with respect to the center of the distribution actually
has no bearing on whether a candidate may find it optimal to enter as a sure loser.
Instead, what matters is that they do not cannibalize vote share exclusively from
their preferred alternative candidate.
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Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium with three candidates, x, y, and L, where
only candidate L loses with certainty if and only if
1. vx(x, y,L) = vy(x, y,L) > vL(x, y,L).
2. d(x,L) ≠ d(y,L).
3. b ≥ 2c − d(x, y).
4. If d(x,L) < d(y,L), vx(x, y) < vy(x, y) and d(y,L) − d(x,L) ≥ c.
5. If d(x,L) > d(y,L), vx(x, y) > vy(x, y) and d(x,L) − d(y,L) ≥ c.
6. f(vL) is not symmetric across the line si = sx+sy2 + ex−eysy−sx (ei − ex+ey2 ). If d(x,L) <
d(y,L), f(vL) is more dense closer to y, and if d(x,L) > d(y,L), f(vL) is more
dense closer to x.
Items 4 and 5 from Proposition 3 imply that the sure loser, L, cannot be extreme
with respect to party competition. She can, however, be extreme with respect to
the center of the distribution. In particular, L may be distant from the axis of party
competition, but unless she is fully orthogonal and lies on the line si = sx+sy2 + ex−eysy−sx (ei−
ex+ey
2 ), she will still have preferences over x and y. So long as the density set of her
voters, f(vL), is not symmetric over the dividing line between candidates x and y,
she can asymmetrically influence the vote shares of candidates x and y. Moreover,
those conditions also imply that the above line cannot be an element of M , the set
of median lines.
2.5 Compromise Effects
Citizen candidate models typically offer a visual representation of candidates’ po-
sitions, but voters translate the candidates’ positions into their idiosyncratic issue
space. Voters view candidates as bundles of issue positions in R2, and, for the purpose
of framing effects analysis, have preferences exhibiting the compromise and attraction
effects, as in Poterack (2015). Given a ballot of candidates, voters’ preferences are
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influenced by the context created by the ballot. Specifically, the context is the vec-
tor of worst issue positions among the candidates running, called the frame. When
comparing choices from ballots with the same frame, the decision makers’ choices
satisfy WARP; however, when comparing ballots with different frames, WARP may
be violated. This implies the existence of a collection of complete and transitive pref-
erences indexed by frames. The compromise and attraction effects are encompassed
when lowering the frame changes the preference to one where the indifference curves
are rotated clockwise, and moving the frame left gives new preferences such that the
curves are rotated counterclockwise.
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Figure 2⋅1: Indifference Curve Rotation in Response to Frame
Changes
A voter’s view of a candidate can be represented as a pair of negative numbers: the
candidate’s distance from the voter on economic issues, and the candidate’s distance
on social issues, both multiplied by negative one (because a larger distance makes for
a less attractive candidate). In other words, voter a views candidate x as the bundle(−∣x1 − a1∣,−∣x2 − a2∣).
This can be illustrated in the candidate space by drawing horizontal and vertical
axes through the voter, and reflecting the candidates over these lines until they are all
below and to the left of them. A ballot of candidates as follows would be translated
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to voter a’s preference space as shown in Figure 2⋅2:
qa
sy
sx
qa
sy
ssx
Figure 2⋅2: Translating from Candidate Space to Voter’s Idiosyncratic
Preference Space
To see the impact of the compromise and attraction effects, consider a voter space
consisting of all possible combinations of economic and social positions. Suppose this
space can be represented by [0,1]2. Furthermore, suppose the underlying density is
such that the yolk of the distribution is the point (12 , 12). In other words, for both
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sets of issues, 12 is the median position. Consider two candidates, x and y, which are
both equidistant from the yolk and which both lie on a line passing through the yolk.
Without loss of generality, suppose (as pictured above) x is in the upper right, and y
is in the lower left.
Every voter in the upper right quadrant prefers x to y, because they are closer
to x on both dimensions. Similarly, every voter in the lower left prefers y to x. If
these quadrants contain the same measure of voters, this means x and y are tied when
excluding the upper left and lower right quadrants. It is the votes in these quadrants
which will break the tie.
Put another way, if the median is (12 , 12), x = (12 − n1, 12 − n2) y = (12 + n1, 12 + n2),
and a = (12 − p1, 12 + p2), table 2.1 demonstrates how a views x and y:
n1 > p1 p1 > n1
n2 > p2 x = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2) x = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2)
y = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) y = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
p2 > n2 x = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2) x = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2)
y = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) y = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
Table 2.1: Election view of voter a
This clearly indicates that a prefers x on one dimension, and y on the other. So
it is possible a prefers x, or y. a may even be indifferent. This information is not
useful.
However, consider a′, a rotated 180○ around the median (a′ = (m + p1,m − p2)). a
and a′ make a line segment whose midpoint is also the midpoint of the line segment
connecting x and y. This fact creates a relationship between a and a′’s views of the
candidates. a′’s view of the candidates is in table 2.2:
a′ has the exact opposite view of the candidates from a; a′ views x in the same
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n1 > p1 p1 > n1
n2 > p2 x = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) x = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
y = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2) y = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2)
p2 > n2 x = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) x = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
y = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2) y = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2)
Table 2.2: Election view of voter a′
position that a views y, and vice versa. Furthermore, because they perceive a ballot
with the same bundles, just swapped, they both have the same frame. In other words,
if a prefers x, a′ prefers y, and vice versa. Furthermore, if we assume the upper left
and lower right quadrants have the same number of voters, then there is an a′ in the
lower right for every a in the upper left. Therefore, any votes x gets in the upper left
are matched by votes for y in the lower right, and x and y tie.
Now, if a third candidate z enters, such that z is below and to the left of y, it is
no longer the case that a and a′ have equal and opposite views of the election. They
both view z in a position where the other perceives no candidate. See Figure 2⋅3.
Because of this discrepancy, they perceive different frames. However, they each
perceive a frame which asymmetrically benefits y, relative to the two candidate case.
a perceives the frame as having shifted down, which benefits the lower candidate,
while a′ perceives the frame as shifting left, which benefits the leftmost candidate.
This implies that while the introduction of z may induce a candidate in the upper
left or lower right to switch from supporting x to supporting y, none of them will
switch from supporting y to supporting x. z thus induces a gain in votes for y and
reduction in votes for x. z also takes votes from y; some voters will prefer z to y. (If
the indifference curves have a typical convex shape, z will only take votes from y, not
x. z has incentive to enter if the votes they give y outweigh those taken.
This result applies whether or not z is on the same line as x and y. If a fourth
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candidate, w, enters on the line passing through z and the median, such that w and
z are equidistant from the median, this makes the frames identical for a and a′ again.
Thus, they then again have equal and opposite preference over the candidates, and x
and y again tie. This suggests a natural equilibrium has four candidates of this form.
To characterize a specific equilibrium, we impose the functional form for utility
U(ex, sx, ei, si; ei, si) = (∣ei − ei∣ − ∣ex − ei∣) 12 + (∣si − si∣ − ∣sx − si∣) 12
Moreover, assume that the support of F is given by [0,1]2 and F (.) is symmetric
over si = 1 − ei.
Proposition 4. There exists a four candidate equilibrium where candidates L1, L2,
x, and y have ideal policies (0,0), (1,1), (12 − a, 12 − a), and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively,
and L1 and L2 lose with certainty, if and only if
3
2d(x, y) ≥ c, b ≥ 2c − d(x, y) and the
following distributional conditions:
1. vx(L1, L2, x, y) = vy(L1, L2, x, y).
2. vx(L2, x, y) < vy(L2, x, y).
3. vy(L1, x, y) < vy(L1, x, y).
4. ∄i such that vi(L1, L2, x, y, i) > maxj∈{L1,L2,x,y} vj(L1, L2, x, y, i).
The conditions on vote shares necessary to sustain equilibrium are characterized in
Section B.1.2 of the appendix. Most noteworthy, in this equilibrium there are both
upper and lower bounds on the number of voters who are in the quadrants of the
policy space orthogonal to the axis of party competition. In essence, if voters are
sufficiently correlated in their policy preferences to lie on the same dimension as
party competition, they find it too easy to rank parties (one is strictly better than
the other for a generic voter) and cannot be influenced by the compromise effect. If,
on the other hand, there are sufficiently many voters who have preferences that are
not represented well by candidates, there are too many voters who can be influenced
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by the compromise effect to sustain this equilibrium. In that case, a centrist entrant
located at the yolk would obtain a plurality and win the election. For example, a
uniform distribution over the space [0,1]2 would not sustain this equilibrium, since
an entrant at (12 , 12) would obtain a strict majority.
The qualitative properties of the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4 are of
particular interest. Previous models which generate sure losers either do so because
they are unable to choose not to enter (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000) or because
they gain an advantage from cannibalizing the votes of their less preferred candidate
(Solow 2015 and Section 2.4 of this paper). Instead, in this particular equilibrium,
the sure losers are extreme with respect to party competition: they only receive votes
from voters with whom share a second favorite candidate. Instead, their motivation to
enter comes from changing the perception that moderate voters have of their preferred
candidate.5 Thus, candidates who are extreme with respect to party competition may
still favorably affect their preferred moderate’s chance of victory despite cannibaliz-
ing votes only from their preferred moderate. The second and third distributional
conditions require that the votes accruing to candidate x from L1 favorably altering
how she is perceived are more numerous than the votes L1 herself receives.
While the equilibrium in Proposition 4 features maximally extreme sure losers,
there will generically exist equilibria with less extreme sure losers. For example,
symmetrically perturbing L1 and L2 closer to the yolk, e.g. (, ) and (1 − ,1 − ),
may still be an equilibrium. The potential candidates at (0,0) and (1,1) may choose
not to enter since they would frame L1 and L2 more attractively and potentially
have a detrimental effect on candidates x and y. Nevertheless, if there exists a linear
5There is suggestive experimental evidence that this is the case. Eric Loepp, writing in the Wash-
ington Post, cites preliminary results of an experiment he is conducting that suggests that Republican
voters change their evaluation of a moderate candidate’s ideology when paired with an extreme con-
servative candidate. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/16/trump-
changes-how-voters-view-the-other-republican-candidates-heres-how/, accessed March 30, 2016.
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equilibrium with extremist sure losers who are not maximally differentiated, then
there surely exists a linear equilibrium with maximally differentiated sure losers. The
intuition is straightforward: all potential candidates who are extreme with respect to
party competition on the line have utility of candidates x and y winning the election
the same as all other potential candidates in their neighborhood. Thus, if an extreme
entrant who is not maximally differentiated finds it optimal to enter as a sure loser,
the payoff conditions will also be satisfied for a maximally differentiated extremist.
The maximally differentiated extremist, however, provides a more favorable frame to
their preferred moderate (since they are further away), and steals strictly fewer votes.
Therefore, the distributional conditions summarized in Section B.1.2 are necessary
conditions for any equilibria in this class.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a multidimensional citizen-candidate model of entry into
plurality elections. We show that limiting the degree of commitment available to
potential candidates restores pure strategy Nash equilibria which do not exist in a
Hotelling-Downs model of multidimensional spatial competition. Moreover, expand-
ing the issue space past one dimension provides novel incentives for candidates. We
characterize the first multicandidate equilibria with a sure winner in a political entry
game with single-peaked preferences. This equilibrium has normatively undesirable
properties which occur even in examples without single-peaked preferences. In par-
ticular, the certain victor is a Condorcet loser among the set of candidates for office.
We then utilize the multiple dimensions to study two well-documented violations
of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: the attraction and compromise effects.
We model these effects via frames of reference and show that the behavior of ex-
tremists can have asymmetric effects which favor their preferred moderate candidate.
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Moreover, we show that with the right distribution of preferences there may exist an
equilibrium where extremists enter despite losing with certainty solely to enhance the
probability of victory of their preferred moderate through framing effects.
We do not, however, provide a full characterization of all equilibria of this game,
especially in the setting with behavioral voters. Of particular interest in further
research would be modifying the frame from the composite minima we study to an
alternative formulation that does not require boundedness of the issue space. While
equilibria with extreme sure losers who are not on the boundary do exist in our
model, expanding the issue space will always give greater incentive for sure losers on
the boundary. This is an undesirable feature of our formulation.
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Figure 2⋅3: Asymmetric Framing Effects
Chapter 3
Giving the Gift of Guilt Avoidance
3.1 Introduction
One remarked upon result from economic theory is that a gift in kind cannot increase
surplus more than a gift in cash. The popularity of giving a gift card, allowing the
recipient to purchase whatever they desire from a given merchant, partially supports
this theory, as a gift card is closer to cash than a gift of an actual good; of course, the
same theory again suggests that cash is better still. Is it possible for a gift card to
increase its recipient’s surplus by more than a gift of cash in the same amount? This
is both a question about the deadweight loss of gift giving, and about preferences
over menus, specifically the preference for commitment to a smaller menu. A gift of
cash is equivalent to a menu of all goods that can be purchased with the cash, and
the gift card is a smaller menu, restricted only to goods at the merchant issuing the
card.
There is extensive work in the literature on preferences for smaller menus, most
notably in the work on temptation beginning with Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). They
take a set of lotteries X, and define a preference ≿ over the set of menus M, i.e.,
the collection of all non-empty compact subsets of X. Their decision makers face a
struggle between normative and temptation preferences: what they think they should
choose, and what they might be tempted to choose. For example, a dieter may have a
normative preference to eat salad, but be tempted to eat a burger (and potentially give
in to this temptation). Given a normative preference for menu A over B, the decision
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maker weakly prefers to commit to menu A, rather than face it alongside B, which
may contain tempting elements. Even if the decision maker does not succumb to
temptation, they still may pay a self-control cost for resisting it. Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001) capture this with their main axiom, Set-Betweenness : given menus A,B ∈M,
if A ≿ B, then A ≿ A ∪B ≿ B.
Temptation therefore provides a rationale for why a decision maker would prefer
to commit to a menu of normatively preferred goods. However, could a decision
maker prefer to commit to a normatively dispreferred menu, rather than face a larger
menu? One possible reason for this would be the presence of guilt. Consider the point
of view of a dieter. He would prefer to eat a salad {s}, but if he’s at a restaurant
with a burger {b} on the menu, he will be tempted to order the burger instead. Set-
Betweenness implies the preference {s} ≿ {s, b} ≻ {b}; i.e., he would prefer a menu
with just salad to a menu with both salad and burger, so that he is not tempted by
the burger. Importantly, he would weakly prefer the menu with both salad and a
burger to the menu with just a burger, as it provides the possibility of ordering salad,
and even if temptation is succumbed to, ordering a burger off the menu with both is
no worse than ordering off the menu with burger alone.
This may not hold in a world with guilt. In a world with guilt, it is possible
that in addition to the self control cost which makes it strictly worse to order a salad
off the menu {s, b} than off the menu {s}, there is also a guilt cost which makes it
strictly worse to order a burger off the menu {s, b} than to order a burger off the menu{b}. In this instance, we may observe the preferences {s} ≿ {b} ≿ {s, b}; the menu{s, b} is the least preferred because it leaves the decision maker in a double bind,
doomed to pay either a self control cost or a guilt cost, no matter which he chooses.
Guilt behavior therefore can be expressed by the axiom Partial Set-Betweenness, from
Kopylov (2007). The axiom weakens Set-Betweenness by allowing for the preference
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A ≿ B ≻ A ∪B. If menu A is preferred to menu B, the decision maker always weakly
prefers to commit to A rather than choose from the union of both menus. However,
unlike in Set Betweenness, the decision maker does not necessarily prefer the union
of both menus to comitting to B, unless A and B both contain the same normatively
best element. Guilt arises from rejecting a normatively preferred element in favor of
a tempting one. Ordering a burger off of a menu that also includes salad incurs no
more guilt than ordering one off a menu that also includes salad and a hot dog; in
both cases, the guilt arises from spurning the salad to order a less healthy item. This
axiom applies well to the observation at hand. If x represents a menu of normatively
preferred necessities, and y represents a gift card for tempting indulgences, {x, y}
may represent cash which can be spent on either, and the desired menu preference is{x} ≿ {y} ≿ {x, y}. Committing to y removes the guilt cost of not choosing to buy
necessities. As such, I refer to the act of committing to a normatively dispreferred
menu as “guilt avoidance.”
However, this suggests decision makers might immediately use their cash to buy
gift cards, thereby allowing guilt free consumption. This seems self-defeating, as the
very act of trying to avoid guilt by purchasing the gift card should itself incur guilt.
Therefore, the desired model would indicate a preference for receiving a gift card, but
not for choosing one for one’s self.
This fits well within the realm of gift giving. Clearly, when the benefit from
receiving a good differs from the benefit of choosing the good for one’s self, there
is the potential for benefit from gift giving. This arises naturally in the context of
guilt. A decision maker cannot avoid guilt by choosing a limited menu for herself, as
this very act of guilt avoidance itself incurs guilt. However, if she receives the menu
unprompted from another, she has received the gift of guilt avoidance.
To capture this, I propose a multiperiod model, where in the first period the
55
decision maker is gifted a menu of menus, and in the second period chooses from
this menu. Second period preferences are revealed by choice; first period preferences
are revealed by amounts of cash the decision maker would be indifferent to. In other
words, if the decision maker strictly prefers receiving the menu of menus A to receiving
menus of menus B, this means that when in possession of A, the amount of cash they
would need to receive to trade A is greater than the amount they’d need to trade B.
Why use such an arcane procedure for revealed preference? The very behavior of
interest seems to suggest an agent who, when in possession of $n, would not spend it
on a gift card, but when in possession of an $n gift card, would want more than $n to
trade it. This seems to be a distinction between choice behavior and trade behavior.
I argue this stems from the observation that people feel more moral culpability from
action than from inaction, even when the distinction between the two is slight. For
a decision maker to purchase herself a gift card is an action, which would inspire
guilt, and defeat the purpose of buying the gift card. However, to refuse a trade for
an already possessed card is inaction, which does not inspire moral culpability, and
results in no guilt.
Formally, the analysis proceeds with a three period model, inspired by Noor and
Ren (2015). There is a set of lotteries X, a set of menus of lotteries M1, i.e., the
set of all non-empty compact subsets of X, and a set of menus of menus M0, the
set of all non-empty compact subsets of M1. The primitive is a preference ≿; this
primitive can be interpreted as arising from a dollar amount associated with each
menu of menus, which represents the minimum amount the decision maker is willing
to accept in trade for the menu of menus, given that they have received it as a gift.
Given A,B ∈ M0, A ≿ B if the dollar amount associated with A is greater than
or equal to that associated with B. Preferences over these menus of menus reflect
the preference for commitment to normatively dispreferred items in order to avoid
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guilt. In the second period, the decision maker chooses a menu from the menu of
menus, and because they are choosing, they do not have preference for commitment to
normatively dispreferred items, because this commitment in itself would incur guilt.
Singleton menus of menus are a commitment to the menu for the last period, which
effectively removes the interim period. In the interim period, menus are chosen from
the menu of menus according to the preferences over commitment to menus. Because
menus are chosen in this period, and this choice is active, these preferences do not
reflect the desire to commit to a normatively dispreferred menu for purposes of guilt
avoidance. The desired behavior, therefore, is that while preferences over all menus
of menus obey Partial Set-Betweenness, preferences over singleton menus of menus
obey Set-Betweenness. I propose coupling Partial Set-Betweenness with the axiom
Singleton Set-Betweenness which captures this behavior.
If a preference ≿ over M0 obeys Weak Order, Continuity, Independence (as all
the preceding axioms are typically defined), Partial Set-Betweenness, and Singleton
Set-Betweenness, then there exists a representation of the following form:
W (A) = max
a∈A [U(a) −maxb∈A (V (b) − V (a)) − κmaxc∈A (U(c) −U(a))]
where U(a) = max
x∈a [u(x) −maxy∈a (v(y) − v(x))]
where u, v, U , and V are positive, linear functions. Clearly, this functional form
is related to GP, but with the additional term κmaxc∈A (U(c) −U(a)), representing
guilt. This term is found in Kopylov’s working paper, and represents the guilt cost
from not choosing the normatively best element in a menu. It is not found in the
U(a) term, because this represents the decision maker’s preferences over active choice,
where guilt avoidance is not a factor.
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper borrows from Kopylov (2007), notably in the concept of a preference for
smaller menus as a means of guilt avoidance. That paper, however, does not address
the notion that guilt avoidance causes guilt; it is a single period model, with no
distinction between action and inaction.
Noor and Ren (2015) is based around active choice, and embraces the notion that
guilt avoidance causes guilt; because of this, they reject that a decision maker can
prefer a smaller menu for reasons of guilt avoidance. As such, they maintain Set-
Betweenness, and do not allow for the possibility of preferring a menu restricted to
normatively dispreferred goods. However, my point is that when considering inactive
choice, guilt avoidance does not necessarily lead to guilt, because the decision maker
lacks moral culpability. This can be reflected by an alternative interpretation of
revealed preference based on trades for menus of menus one is already in possession
of.
This paper also has implications for work on the deadweight loss of gift-giving; the
conclusions reached here allow for the possibility of surplus from gift-giving. There
have been many papers using survey and experimental data to measure the dead-
weight loss (or surplus) of gift giving; these include a series beginning with Waldfogel
(1993), which saw responses from Solnick and Hemenway (1996) and List and Shogren
(1998). They have reached differing conclusions, some showing a deadweight loss from
gift giving, and others showing a surplus. These papers propose asymmetric informa-
tion as a potential source for surplus: a gift giver who knows more about a recipient’s
preferences than the recipient can well increase the recipient’s surplus through a gift
in kind. There is no suggestion of guilt avoidance as a potential source of surplus.
There is also work on theoretical frameworks allowing for surplus, including Solow
(1993) and Thaler (1985). Neither paper explicitly models guilt. Solow suggests
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the possibility of externalities which accrue to the gift-giver. Thaler has a model of
mental accounting, wherein decision makers artificially constrict themselves from al-
locating additional cash gifts to budgets for goods they may desire to receive as gifts.
This idea of mental accounting could be motivated by guilt, though Thaler does not
explicit state this. The representation in his paper is distinct from this paper, and
he does not provide a behavioral foundation.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Primitives
Consider a set of goods X, a convex subset of a linear space. Mixtures αx + (1 −α)y
are well defined for all α ∈ [0,1] and x, y ∈X. Use metric d such that
1. X is compact
2. mixture operation mapping [0,1]×X ×X →X is continuous; i.e., αx+ (1−α)y
is continuous in α for all x, y
3. For each α ∈ [0,1] and x, y, x′, y′ ∈X
d(αx + (1 − α)x′, αy + (1 − α)y′) ≤ max{d(x, y), d(x′, y′)}
This general specification applies to many settings used in other decision theory
papers. For example, these conditions are satisfied when X is the convex compact
subset of a normed linear space with the metric induced by the norm, as used by
Dekel et al. (2001), or the class of all Borel probability measures on a compact metric
Z with the Prohorov metric d of the weak convergence topology, as used by Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001).
Let M1 be the set of all non-empty compact subsets of X, i.e., the set of menus.
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For each a, b ∈M1, define mixtures and the Hausdorff metric µ1 in M1 by
αa + (1 − α)b = {αx + (1 − α)y∣x ∈ a, y ∈ b}
µ1(a, b) = inf {ε > 0∣b ⊂ aε and a ⊂ bε}
where aε and bε are the ε-neighborhoods of the sets a and b in the metric space(X,d). According to Kopylov (2009b), M1 is a compact metric space with continuous
mixture operation.
Now consider M0, the set of all non-empty compact subsets of M1. M0 is the
set of “menus of menus”. Endow M0 with a mixture operation and metric defined
analogously as those on M1.
There is a three period decision making process. In period 0, the decision maker
is gifted a menu of menus A ∈M0. In period 1, the decision maker chooses a menu
a ∈ A. In period 2, the decision maker chooses and consumes a good x ∈ a.
The guilt behavior studied in this paper reflects decision makers who would prefer
to receive a gift that they would not choose to buy themselves. The primitive for this
model is a preference ≿. I interpret this preference as being revealed by a series of
dollar amounts associated with each menu of menus. Each dollar amount represents
the minimum the decision maker would accept in trade for a menu of menus, given
that they are already in possession of it. The difference between receiving a gift and
purchasing a menu is moral culpability. The former is passive and the latter is active.
The decision maker feels guilt over action, but not over inaction. If the decision maker
purchased herself a gift card, this attempt at guilt avoidance would itself inspire guilt
which cancels out any guilt avoidance benefit. However, to receive such a gift does
not inspire guilt, allowing her to indulge in guilt avoidance. This is what motivates
the primitive. By asking to trade a menu of menus already in possession, the desire
for guilt avoidance can be isolated. In rejecting cash in trade, the decision maker
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feels morally justified and guilt free. As such, her preference should be interpreted as
normative. A ≿ B is interpreted as meaning that the dollar amount associated with
A is greater than or equal to the dollar amount associated with B. Given a utility
function representing ≿, it can be interpreted as follows: the dollar amounts associated
with each menu of menus are an increasing function of the utility value of each menu
of menus. In period 1, the decision maker chooses the highest ranking menu in their
menu of menus according to the preference ≿ over singleton menus of menus. Because
the decision maker is making an active choice, they cannot successfully avoid guilt,
and these preferences do not represent the desire for commitment to normatively
dispreferred menus.
3.3.2 Representation
The desired representation is of the following form:
W (A) = max
a∈A [U(a) −maxb∈A (V (b) − V (a)) − κmaxc∈A (U(c) −U(a))]
where U(a) = max
x∈a [u(x) −maxy∈a (v(y) − v(x))]
where u, v, and V are positive, linear functions1. This is a Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2001) representation applied to multiple periods, with the addition of the term−κmaxc∈A (U(c) −U(a)), representing the desire for guilt avoidance. This term gives
the decision maker a “guilt cost” from not choosing the most normatively preferred
menu from a menu of menus, similar to the “self control cost” term −maxb∈A (V (b) − V (a))
which imposes a cost of not choosing the most tempting menu. As the “self control
cost” creates a desire to commit to a smaller menus of menus, restricted to norma-
tively preferred menus, the “guilt cost” creates a desire to commit to a smaller menu
1Note that V is independent of v.
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of menus which excludes more normatively preferred menus.
Given a comparison between choosing menu a from two menus of menus A,B ∈M0 such that they both contain the same normatively best menu, the “guilt cost”
term will be identical for both, meaning the comparison will reduce to a Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) representation. If the choice a is not contained in both menus,
the term is not meaningful. This will have implications for the behavioral axioms
used to explore guilt avoidance, discussed in the next subsection.
Note that the function U(a) represents the normative ranking of menus, even
though it contains self control costs, just as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). Further-
more, the function W (A) represents the normative ranking of menus of menus, even
though it contains both self control and guilt costs. As mentioned in the previous
section, the preference ≿ over menus of menus reflects a desire for guilt avoidance, but
is still normative, as the decision maker feels morally justified in her guilt avoidance.
Numerical Example
The fact that this representation captures the desired behavior can be shown in the
following example. Suppose a decision maker desires necessities, x, and luxuries, y.
The menu of menus {{y}} represents the gift of a gift card which can only be spent
on luxuries, and the menu of menus {{x, y},{y}} represents the gift of cash, which,
in the interim, can be kept as cash, or spent on a gift card. Suppose there is no gift
card to commit to spending on necessities. If the decision maker keeps the cash as
cash, she is choosing the menu {x, y} from the menu of menus they have been gifted.
If she spends it on a gift card, she has chosen the menu {y}.
Suppose u(x) = 3, v(y) = 2, u(y) = v(x) = 0, κ = 2. In other words, x is normatively
preferred, y is tempting, and the decision maker experiences guilt. Suppose V ({y}) =
2 and2 V ({x, y}) = 0. This gives rise to the following utility values:
2Noor and Ren (2015) give axioms which guarantee for a similar model that V (a) =
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W ({{y}}) = U({y}) = u(y) = 0 (3.3.1)
W ({{x, y}}) = U ({x, y}) = u(x) − (v(y) − v(x)) = 1 (3.3.2)
W ({{x, y},{y}}) = U ({x, y}) − (V ({y}) − V ({x, y})) − κ(0) = −1 (3.3.3)
The gift of the gift card returns a utility of 0, which makes it preferred to the gift
of cash {{x, y},{y}}, which returns a utility of -1. However, if the decision maker
is given cash, then in the interim, she faces a choice between spending the cash gift
on a gift card, i.e., choosing {y}, or keeping it as cash, i.e., choosing {x, y}. This
decision is made according to the preference over the relevant singleton menus of
menus, which shows that keeping the cash as cash is preferred, returning a utility
of 1. Receiving cash is worse than keeping cash, because receiving cash includes the
option to purchase a gift card, leaving the decision maker in the double bind of being
required to face either a guilt cost or a self control cost.
3.3.3 Axioms
Axiom 1 (Weak Order). ≿ is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all menus of menus A ∈M0, the sets {B ∈M0∣ B ≿ A}
and {B ∈M0∣A ≿ B} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all α ∈ [0,1] and menus of menus A,B,C ∈M0,
A ≻ B ⇒ αA + (1 − α)C ≻ αB + (1 − α)C
Weak Order, Continuity, and Independence are standard conditions; the justifi-
cation for the use of Independence found in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Dekel
et al. (2001) applies here as well.
maxx∈a [v(x) −maxy∈a (u(y) − u(x))], which is consistent with the values given here.
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Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use the axiom Set-Betweenness, which states that for
any menus a, b ∈ M1, a ≿ b ⇒ A ≿ A ∪ B ≿ B. In the present model, the presence
of guilt is evidenced by the desire to commit to a normatively dispreferred menu
of menus, rather than face a larger menu of menus containing it and a normatively
preferred menu of menus. Clearly, Set-Betweenness rules out this behavior, and needs
to be replaced with a weakened axiom.
Because commitment to a normatively dispreferred menu is motivated by guilt
avoidance, it should only be desired when the smaller, normatively dispreferred menu
of menus excludes the normatively best menu from the larger menu of menus. For any
c ∈M1, define Mc = {A ∈M0∣c ∈ A and {c} ≿ {b} for all b ∈ A}. This is the set of all
menus of menus with the same normatively best menu c. As there is no motivation
for guilt avoidance by choosing a smaller menu of menus from Mc over a larger
menu of menus also in Mc, preferences over these menus of menus should not reflect
guilt avoidance, and not violate Set-Betweenness. This behavior is captured by the
following axiom, due to Kopylov (2007):
Axiom 4 (Partial Set-Betweenness). For all c ∈M1 and menus of menus A,B ∈M0,
1. if A ≿ B, then A ≿ A ∪B
2. if A ≿ B and A,B ∈Mc, then A ∪B ≿ B.
As mentioned above, choices made by the decision maker in period 1 are repre-
sented by the preference ≿ over singleton menus. The decision maker in period 1 is
engaged in active choice, and thus susceptible to feeling guilt for engaging in guilt
avoidance. As such, they do not exhibit a preference for guilt avoidance in this period;
the guilt they would feel over actively engaging in guilt avoidance renders such action
meaningless. This behavior is captured by the following axiom:
Axiom 5 (Singleton Set-Betweenness). For all singleton menus of menus {a},{b} ∈M0, {a} ≿ {b}⇒ {a} ≿ {a ∪ b} ≿ {b}.
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The interpretation of the axioms is that temptation is experienced in both the
interim and final stages, and guilt is experienced in the interim stage. Given the
preference {{x}} ≻ {{y}} over goods x, y ∈ X, the axioms allow for the preference{{x}} ≻ {{x, y}}, which indicates a desire for commitment to avoid temptation in the
final stage, as this is when the choice from the menu {x, y} would be made. Similarly,
given the preference {a} ≻ {b} over menus a, b ∈ M1, the axioms allow for the pref-
erence {a} ≻ {a, b}. This indicates a desire for commitment to avoid temptation in
the interim stage, as this is when the choice from the menu of menus {a, b} would be
made. Preferences consistent with the axioms are also naturally interpreted as show-
ing guilt to be experienced in the interim stage, because again given the preference{a} ≻ {b} over menus a, b ∈M1, the axioms allow for the preference {b} ≻ {a, b}. This
must indicate a desire to avoid guilt in the interim stage. When facing the menu of
menus {a, b} in the interim stage, the decision maker will choose a (as {a} ≻ {b}),
and facing a in the final stage does not inspire guilt in that stage.
The model does not make an explicit claim about whether guilt is experienced
in the final stage. Guilt is reflected in behavior by guilt avoidance, the desire for
commitment to normatively dispreferred menus. However, guilt in the final stage
cannot inspire this behavior in the interim stage, because this behavior would in
and of itself cause guilt. The decision maker is sophisticated enough to recognize
that if she makes any attempt to avoid guilt by choosing a restricted menu in the
interim period, she has committed an act for which she is morally culpable, and
this cancels out any gains from guilt avoidance. As such, there is no behavioral
expression of guilt experienced in the final stage. While certain preferences may
only indicate interim period guilt, as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, other
preferences can be interpreted as revealing guilt in either stage. For example, given
goods x, y ∈X such that {{x}} ≻ {{x, y}} ≻ {{y}}, the axioms allow for the preference
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{{y}} ≻ {{x, y},{y}}. This preference can be interpreted as a desire to avoid guilt in
the interim or in the final stage. The decision maker may pay a psychic guilt cost
from facing the menu {x, y} in the final stage as opposed to menu {y}, but this can
only be behaviorally expressed in her preferences over menus of menus.
The preceding axioms allow for the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Multi-Period Guilt Representation Theorem). A preference ≿ over the
set of menus M0 satisfies Order, Continuity, Independence, Partial Set-Betweenness,
and Singleton Set-Betweenness if and only if it has a representation of the following
form:
W (A) = max
a∈A U(b) −maxb∈A [V (b) − V (a)] − κmaxc∈A [U(c) −U(a)]
where u, v,U and V are linear, positive functions.
Proof. See appendix C.1. The proof is an extension of the proof from Kopylov (2007)
to multiple periods.
3.4 Conclusion
Guilt is a feature of human psychology which has many behavioral implications; one
of them is a desire to limit one’s options in order to avoid guilt. Decision makers
may gain a benefit from being forced into choosing a tempting option which their
normative preferences steer them away from, and this benefit can be captured in the
representation offered by this paper. Previous attempts to model this have run into
the difficulty that guilt avoidance causes guilt, and need to find various ways to deal
with this. This paper proposes a novel definition of revealed preference in an attempt
to avoid this difficulty. This definition of revealed preference may have application to
other observations from decision theory, such as the endowment effect.
This benefit from commitment also has implications for gift giving. In order for
the possibility of gains from gift-giving to exist, there must be something the giver
can offer the recipient that the recipient cannot given themselves. Other papers
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have focused on the possibility of the giver having additional information; this paper
focuses on the gift of guilt avoidance. Guilt afflicted decision makers are explicitly
unable to avoid their own guilt; they need another to avoid it for them. This allows
for gains from gift giving, as the gift giver is able to give a gift the decision maker
cannot give themselves.
While this paper focuses on a decision making procedure over a small number of
periods, an infinite horizon model could allow for an alternative conceptualization of
the behavior of interest. A future oriented decision maker may underinvest in current
consumption, and have an interest in commitment to such consumption, even if it is
normatively dispreferred. This is a promising area for future research, particularly
as it may be compatible with a more typical revealed preference approach. I chose
a different approach because I felt it more clearly isolated the particular behavior of
interest, especially in the context of a gift-giving situation, which does not have an
obvious infinite horizon extension.
Appendix A
Appendices to The Compromise and
Attraction Effects Through Frame
Preferences
A.1 The n-attribute Case
For simplicity, the main body of the paper assumes there are only two attributes along
which goods are judged. However, the model extends naturally to the n-attribute
case, with minimal modification. Suppose the set of goods is Rn. As before, define
attribute preferences ≿1, . . . ,≿n. The natural extension of the frame definition is
f(S) = (minx∈S x1, . . . ,minx∈S xn). Having defined the frame, it is now easy to define
the frame preference by
x ≿f y⇔ ∃ S ∈ S such that x,y ∈ S, f(S) = f , x ∈ C(S)
As before, ≿f is only defined on
Af ≡ {x ∈X ∣xi ≥ fi ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} (A.1.1)
Finally, the definition of the pairwise preference ≿∗ is unchanged: x ≿∗ y ⇔ x ∈
C({x,y}).
The properties have trivial extensions to the n-attribute case, with the exception
of Property 2, which poses more of a challenge. Recall that in the R2 case, Property
2 is a statement about changes in the slope of the indifference curve; therefore, in the
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Rn case, it is a statement about changes in the norm of the hyperplane tangent to
the indifference surfaces.
By Property 2, lowering the frame makes the indifference curves steeper. Another
way to express that is when the frame is decreased in the second component, a vector
perpendicular to an indifference curve at a given point will also decrease in the second
component. Therefore, the n-dimensionally equivalent statement is that when the
frame is decreased in the ith component, the norm of the hyperplane tangent to the
indifference surface also decreases in the ith component.
Define uf(x) ≡ U(x, f). ∇uf(x) = ⟨uf1(x), . . . , ufn(x)⟩ is the norm of the hyperplane
tangent to the indifference surface on which x lies. The desired property is that if
f ′ ≡ (f1, . . . , fi − δ, . . . , fn), for some δ > 0, then ∃ ε > 0 such that
∇uf ′(x)∣∣∇uf ′(x)∣∣ = ⟨uf1(x), . . . , ufi(x) − ε, . . . , ufn(x)⟩∣∣⟨uf1(x), . . . , ufi(x) − ε, . . . , ufn(x)⟩∣∣
i.e, the norm of the new hyperplane tangent to the indifference surface on which x lies
after the frame is lowered on the ith component to f ′ overlaps the old one decreased
on the ith component by some amount.
As with the properties, the axioms remain either entirely unchanged, or have triv-
ial extensions to the n-attribute case, with the exception of Compromise/Attraction
Monotonicity. The extension of this axiom requires some care; however, upon re-
flection it should seem quite natural and intuitive, and clearly equivalent to the n-
dimensional statement of Property 2.
• Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity : Given x ∼f y, define A,B ⊂ {1, . . . , n}
s.t. i ∈ A⇒ x ≻i y, j ∈ B ⇒ y ≻j x.
1. For each i ∈ A,
– y ≻(f−i,f ′i) x ∀ f ′i < fi
– x ≻(f−i,f ′′i ) y ∀ f ′′i ∈ (fi, yi]
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2. For each j ∈ B,
– x ≻(f−j ,f ′j) y ∀ f ′j < fj
– y ≻(f−j ,f ′′j ) x ∀ f ′′j ∈ (fj, xj]
3. For each k ∈ (A ∪B)c,
– x ∼(f−k,f ′k) y ∀ f ′k
Now with the axioms sorted, proceed as before, proposing a representation. Define
vi(x, f) as the solution to
x ∼f (f1, . . . , fi−1, vi(x1, . . . , xn, f1, . . . , fn), fi+1, . . . , fn)
vi is a representation. It is strictly increasing and continuous in xj, ∀ j. vi is decreas-
ing and continuous in fi. Given f ′i > fi, define f ′ ≡ (f1, . . . , f ′i , . . . , fn), and
(f1, . . . , vi(x, f), . . . , fn) ≻f ′ (f1, . . . , vi(x, f ′), . . . , fn)
This is because it must be the case that vi(x, f) ≻i x. Now, consider fmi → fi. Without
loss of generality, suppose this is increasing. Define fm ≡ (f1, . . . , fmi , . . . , fn). fm → f .
Because vi is decreasing in fi,
vi(x, f) ≤ vi(x, fm) ∀ m
Because vi(x, fm) is bounded from below, ∃ infm{vi(x, fm)}, and vi(x, f) ≤ infm{vi(x, fm)}.
If this inequality were strict, it would violate Frame Continuity, so it must hold with
equality, which implies continuity in fi.
Now consider {(f1, . . . , vi(x, f), . . . , fn)}ni=1. All of these points are f -indifferent to
x, so they are all f -indifferent to each other. Furthermore, for any two of them, the
frame of just the pair is f . So any two of the points are pairwise indifferent. By
Pairwise Weak Order, ∃ u∗ representing the pairwise preference. u∗ can show vi is
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decreasing and continuous in fj.
Consider {fpj }∞p=1 → fj. (fp = (f1, . . . , fpj , . . . , fn)). Because vj is continuous in fj,{vj(x, fp)}∞p=1 → vj(x, f). ∀ p,
u∗(f1, . . . , vi(x, fp), . . . , fpj , . . . , fn)=u∗(f1, . . . , vj(x, fp), . . . , fn)
and
u∗(f1, . . . , vi(x, f), . . . , fn)
=u∗(f1, . . . , vj(x, f), . . . , fn)
By continuity of u∗,
{u∗(f1, . . . , vj(x, fp), . . . , fn)}∞p=1 → u∗(f1, . . . , vj(x, f), . . . , fp)
and therefore
{u∗(f1, . . . , vi(x, fp), . . . , fpj , . . . , fn)}∞p=1 → u∗(f1, . . . , vi(x, f), . . . , fn)
Therefore, U = u∗(f1, . . . , vi(x, f), . . . , fn) ∀ i satisfies Property 1. Property 2 is
implied by the n-dimensional version of Compromise/Attraction Monotonicity. Prop-
erties 3 and 4 are still implied by Pairwise Transitivity and Substitutability, respec-
tively.
To show the representation implies the axioms, it remains that the usual argu-
ment implies Continuous Weak Order, Property 4 implies Substitutability, Property
3 implies Pairwise Transitivity, Property 2 implies Compromise/Attraction Mono-
tonicity, and strict increasing in the first n arguments implies Simplicity. This leaves
Frame Continuity and Pairwise Continuity, and the two-dimensional proofs of these
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generalize easily to n dimensions.
A.2 Non-monotonic Attribute Preferences
In many applications, it is natural to have a good’s desirability increase monotoni-
cally in an attribute. For example, all else equal, computers with more RAM, cars
with more gas mileage, and televisions with better picture quality are all preferable.
However, when considering the number of ports on a computer, or the color of a car,
or the size of a television, it is not obvious that preferences over these attributes can
be mapped to a monotonically increasing component.
However, attribute preferences can be established with the following properties,
which are implied by the condition used in the paper:
1. Given x,y ∈ Rn, if there exists p ∈ Rn−1 such that (xi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (yi, p)}),
then for each p′ ∈ Rn−1, (xi, p′) ∈ C ({(xi, p′), (yi, p′)}).
2. “Attribute WARP (aWARP):” Given S,S′ ∈ S, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ∀ s ∈
S,S′, s−i = p−i (∀ − i ≠ i); if x,y ∈ S ∩ S′ and x ∈ C(S), then y ∈ C(S′) implies
x ∈ C(S′).
3. {y ∈ R∣y ∈ C ({(x, p), (y, p)})} and {z ∈ R∣x ∈ C ({(x, p), (z, p)})} are both closed.
The first property establishes that the attributes are indeed distinct; if xi ≻ yi
when they share some common set of other attribute values p, it remains so for any
other set of attribute values p′. The second is a variant on WARP, applying only to
cases where the differences exist only along one attribute. The final property ensures
continuity.
Now, define x ≿i y if and only if (xi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (yi, p)}) for some p ∈ Rn−1.≿i is trivially complete. aWARP implies it is also transitive. Suppose x ≻i y, y ≻i z.
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(xi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (yi, p)})
(yi, p) ∈ C ({(yi, p), (zi, p)})
⇒ (yi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (yi, p), (zi, p)})
⇒ (xi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (yi, p), (zi, p)})
⇒ (xi, p) ∈ C ({(xi, p), (zi, p)})
⇒ x ≻i z
Finally, because property 3 ensures ≻i is continuous, ∃ ui representing ≻i ∀ i. We
can now define a mapping M ∶ Rn → Rn by M(x) = (u1(x), . . . , un(x)). This maps
the goods to a space where their desirability is indeed increasing in the attributes,
and the rest of the proof may proceed as written. These utility functions are not
necessarily surjective, so the space of goods may not cover all of Rn, but that is not
a problem. This technique assumes that two goods x and y such that x ∼i y ∀ i are
treated identically.
Appendix B
Appendices to Extremist Politics and the
Preference for Compromise
B.1 Proofs of Theorems
B.1.1 Multidimensional Citizen-Candidate without Compromise
Lemma 2. There does not exist an equilibrium in which a candidate x loses with
certainty if ∀ i such that arg maxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x, arg maxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) = y for
some y ∈K/{x}.
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose for a contradiction that there does exist an equilibrium
where candidate x loses with certainty, and the above condition is satisfied. The
condition ∀ i such that arg maxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x, arg maxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) = y requires
that all voters who vote for candidate x agree on their second choice, candidate y.
Note also that candidate x reaches their bliss point (in policy) at her own position,
and thus d(x, y) < d(x, z) ∀z ∈K, z ≠ x, y.
In this equilibrium, candidate x obtains a payoff of −c − d(x, k∗), where k∗ is the
ideal policy of the winner. If candidate x exits, candidate y obtains all of her previous
voters. Thus, the new winner of the election is either candidate k∗ who won when x
had entered, or candidate y. Since y is preferred to k∗ by x, the policy outcome of
this election when x exits is weakly preferred by x. Since c > 0, x obtains a strictly
higher payoff by exiting and therefore this equilibrium does not exist. ∎
Corollary 1. In all two candidate equilibria, vx = vy = 12 .
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Definition 1. An equilibrium is linear if there exists a function f ∶ e → s such that
for all j ∈K, sj = aej + b for constants a, b.
Corollary 2. There does not exist a linear equilibrium with a sure loser z where(ez, sz) << (ey, sy) ∀y ∈K, y ≠ z or (ez, sz) >> (ey, sy) ∀y ∈K, y ≠ z.
Note that Lemma 1 recovers Lemma 1 of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) as a special
case (Corollary 2).
Proof of Proposition 1: Start with Proposition 1 (3). By Lemma 1, we know
that there cannot be a sure loser in two candidate elections. Therefore, in any two-
candidate equilibrium, vote shares must be vx = vy = 12 .
Furthermore, the candidates cannot be identical, i.e. d(x, y) > 0. Suppose, in
equilibrium, the two candidates shared the same ideal policy. Then each candidate
has a payoff of 12b−c. If either candidate chose not to enter the race, her payoff would
be 0, as the winner would share her ideal policy. Therefore, it must be the case that
b ≥ 2c. However, if the two candidates share the same position, then by continuity
there exists another potential candidate with a distinct ideal policy who can enter
and obtain arbitrarily close to half the votes. Let such a candidate be denoted by
z. In equilibrium, she obtains payoff of −d(x, z), but by entering would win with
certainty and obtain payoff b − c. Since b ≥ 2c, this potential candidate would not be
best responding. Thus, d(x, y) > 0.
Since d(x, y) > 0 and vx = vy, each candidate obtains a payoff of 12b− 12d(x, y)−c in
equilibrium. If a candidate chose not to enter, she would obtain a payoff of −d(x, y).
Therefore, for candidates to choose to enter in equilibrium, we require 12b− 12d(x, y)−c ≥−d(x, y), or b ≥ 2c−d(x, y). Therefore, for b < 2c, there exists a strictly positive lower
bound on how differentiated candidates will be in all two candidate equilibria.
No potential candidate who is extreme with respect to party competition would
like to enter. They obtain a strict subset of one equilibrium candidates’ voters, and
therefore lose the election. Furthermore, by entering they induce a victory by their
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least preferred equilibrium candidate. If d(x, y) > d∗(F ) then there exists a candidate
who can enter and win the election. Since b ≥ 2c
To prove Proposition 1(1), note that the requirements for all i such that vx(x, y, i) >
vy(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(y, i) − d(x, i)] and for all i such that vy(x, y, i) > vx(x, y, i), c ≥
1
2 [d(x, i) − d(y, i)] guarantee that no candidate who can enter and influence the iden-
tity of the winner find it optimal to do so. If b ≥ 2c, any distance d(x, y) ∈ (0, d∗(F ))
(a nonempty interval) produces an equilibrium. If b < 2c, there exists an equilibrium
if and only if d∗(F ) ≥ 2c − b. ∎
Proof of Proposition 2: In order for x to be a sure winner, it must be the case
that she obtains a larger vote share than any other candidate, and therefore vx >
max{vL1 ; vL2}. Condition two requires that there does not exist a citizen who can
enter and win with certainty, and would prefer to do so. If there exists a potential
candidate z who could enter and win the election with certainty, then they would earn
payoff b−c by entering. In equilibrium, when choosing not to enter, z earns a payoff of−d(x, z). Thus, if b−c ≤ −d(x, z), this candidate would choose not to enter. Therefore,
for any citizen who can win with certainty by entering, we require b ≤ c − d(x, z). By
continuity, if there exists a citizen who can enter and win with probability p < 1,
then there exists a citizen who can enter and win with certainty. The payoff for a
citizen j who can enter and win office with probability p is pb− c− (1− p)d(x, j), and
therefore the payoff restrictions in condition two also exclude entrants who are not
sure winners.
Candidates L1 and L2 obtain payoff of −c−d(L1, x) and −c−d(L2, x) respectively.
For L1 to prefer to enter, it must be the case that she obtains a higher payoff by doing
so. Suppose candidate x is still the winner when L1 exits. Then, L1 has no effect
on the outcome by entering and thus would save c by exiting. Therefore, for this
equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that L2 wins if L1 chooses not to enter. By
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exiting, L1 obtains payoff −d(L1, L2). Thus, for entry to be a best response, it must
be the case that c ≤ d(L1, L2)−d(L1, x). The same conditions hold symmetrically for
candidate L2. These requirements imply conditions three and four.
Depending on the positions of each candidate, there may exist a citizen z who,
when entering, extracts more votes from x than other candidates and can cause Li
to win the election. If such a citizen exists, he obtains −d(x, z) in equilibrium, and−c − d(Li, z) by entering. Thus, to deter such a citizen from entering, it must be the
case that c ≥ d(x, z) − d(Li, z) for all Li such that vLi = maxk∈K∪{z}.
Finally, x obtains payoff b − c in equilibrium. Let L∗ denote whichever of L1 or
L2 would win the election in the event that x exited. Candidate x would therefore
obtain a payoff of −d(x,L∗) by exiting. Therefore, for this to be an equilibrium, it
must be the case that b ≥ c − d(x,L∗). ∎
B.1.2 Equilibria with Compromise Effects
Lemma 3. Assume that there exists two candidates with ideal policies (0,0) and(1,1). Assume that there exists two candidates x and y with ideal policies (12−a, 12−a)
and (12 + a, 12 + a), a ∈ [0, 12) respectively. ∀i such that ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 , and ∀i such
that ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 , i votes for x or y.
Proof: Fix ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 . The utility of voter i from voting for a candidate in this
election is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1 − 2ei + ex) 12 + (sx) 12 ei > ex
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1 − ex) 12 + (sx) 12 ei ≤ ex
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1 − ey) 12 + (2si − sy) 12 si < sy
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1 − ey) 12 + (sy) 12 si ≥ sy
Ui(0,0, ei, si) = (1 − 2ei) 12
Ui(1,1, ei, si) = (2si − 1) 12
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For all i with ei > ex, it is clear that Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) > Ui(0,0, ei, si). If ei ≤ ex,
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1 − (1
2
− a)) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 .
Note that Ui(0,0, ei, si) = (1 − 2ei) 12 ≤ 1. If Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) ≥ 1, we can conclude
that x ≻ L1∀i such that ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 . This condition is satisfied if
(1 − (1
2
− a)) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
(1
2
+ a) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
1
2
+ a + 1
2
− a + 2(1
2
+ a) 12 (1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
2(1
2
+ a) 12 (1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 0
Since (ei, si) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1], this condition always holds. For these voters, it
remains to be shown that they will never choose to vote for L2. Since Ui(1,1, ei, si) =(2si − 1) 12 , the utility a voter receives from voting for L2 is bounded above by 1. If
si ≥ sy, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 , and the above argument follows exactly.
If si < sy, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) is bounded below by (12 − a) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 = (12 − a) 12 +
Ui(1,1, ei, si). Thus, all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 vote
for x or y. It remains to be shown that all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying
ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 vote for x or y.
For all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 , the utility of voting
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for a candidate in this election is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex) 12 + (1 + sx − 2si) 12 si > sx
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex) 12 + (1 − sx) 12 si ≤ sx
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (ey) 12 + (1 − 2si + sy) 12 ei > ey
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (2ei − ey) 12 + (1 − 2si + sy) 12 ei ≤ ey
Ui(0,0, ei, si) = (1 − 2si) 12
Ui(1,1, ei, si) = (2ei − 1) 12
If sx < si, Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex) 12 +(1+sx−2si) 12 whereas Ui(0,0, ei, si) = (1−2si) 12 .
Since ex and sx ≥ 0, for these voters, x ≻ L1. Note that Ui(0,0, ei, si) is bounded above
by 1. If sx ≥ si, Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (12 +a) 12 + (12 −a) 12 ≥ 1 as shown above. Thus, x ≻ L1
for all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 .
If ei ≥ ey, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (12 + a) 12 + (32 − 2si + a) 12 , which is bounded below by
2(12 + a) 12 . Similar to above, Ui(1,1, ei, si) = (2ei − 1) 12 is bounded above by 1. Thus,
for voters with ei ≥ ey, y ≻ L2. If ei < ey, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (2ei− 12 −a) 12 +(32 −2si+a) 12 ,
which is bounded below by (12 −a) 12 +(12 +a) 12 . As shown above, for voters with ei < ey,
y ≻ L2. Therefore, all voters with ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 choose to vote for either x or y. ∎
Lemma 4. Assume that there exists two candidates L1 and L2 with ideal policies(0,0) and (1,1) respectively. Assume that there exists two candidates x and y with
ideal policies (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. L1 obtains votes from all
voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2. L2 obtains
votes from all voters with ei > 12 and si > 12 satisfying si > 12 + 12(2(12 +a) 12 −(2ei−1) 12 )2.
Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [12 − a, 12 + a] vote for x if si ≤ 1 − ei and
vote for y if si > 1 − ei. Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei < 12 − a vote for x if
si ≤ 12 +a and they do not vote for L1 and are indifferent between x and y if si > 12 +a.
Voters satisfying ei > 12 + a vote for y if si > 12 − a and they do not vote for L2 and are
indifferent between x and y if si ≤ 12 − a.
Proof: Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 : Note that these voters will either vote for L1
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or x. Their frame (ei, si) is given by (1,1); for a fixed frame, voters utility of voting
for a candidate is decreasing in the difference in ideal policies. Thus, these voters
strictly prefer both L1 and x to y and L2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 have utility (1 − 2ei) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 of voting for L1.
This set of voters differs in their utility of voting for x by whether they have ei ≥ 12 −a,
si ≥ 12 − a, both or neither. Their utility is given by
Ui(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,1,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(12 + a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a(12 + a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a(32 − 2ei − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a(32 − 2ei − a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a
Since 32 −a > 1, for all voters with ei > 12 −a and si > 12 −a, x is preferred to L1. For
voters with ei ≤ 12−a and si > 12−a, their utility of voting for x is (12+a) 12 +(32−2si−a) 12 ,
whereas their utility of voting for L1 is (1−2ei) 12 +(1−2si) 12 . Their utility of voting for
L1 is bounded above by 1+(1−2si) 12 , whereas the utility of voting for x is constant in
ei. Consider the voter with si = 12 . His utility of voting for x is (12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 > 1
for all a < 12 , whereas his utility of voting for L1 is 1. For all values of a ∈ [0, 12),
this voter strictly prefers x. Now consider the voter with si = 12 − a. His utility of
voting for x is 2(12 + a) 12 , and his utility of voting for L1 is 1 + (2a) 12 . If a = 0, he
strictly prefers voting for x to voting for L1. If a = 12 , he is indifferent between x and
L1. By continuity and monotonicity of U(.) in a, this voter strictly prefers x to L1
for all a ∈ [0, 12). Thus, all voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a strictly prefer x to
L1. By symmetry, this is also true for voters with ei > 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a. Finally,
voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a have utility 2(12 + a) 12 of voting for x and utility
of (1 − 2ei) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 of voting for L1. The set of indifferent voters is given by
si = 12 − 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for L1 is decreasing in
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both ei and si, and the utility of voting for x is constant with respect to ei and si for
these voters, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 +a) 12 − (1−2ei) 12 )2 vote for L1, whereas voters
with si > 12 − 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12 : As above, the fact that U(.) is monotonically
decreasing in difference in ideal policies from a candidate implies that these voters
vote for L2 or y.
These voters have utility U(1,1,0,0) = (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for L2 and
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a(12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
2(12 + a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si > 12 + a
of voting for y.
Voters with ei ≤ 12+a and si ≤ 12+a have utility (2ei− 12−a) 12 +(2si− 12−a) 12 of voting
for y and (2ei−1) 12 +(2si−1) 12 of voting for L2. Since a ∈ [0, 12), these voters all prefer
y to L2. Voters with ei ≤ 12 +a and si > 12 +a have utility (2ei−1) 12 +(2si−1) 12 of voting
for L2 and (2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 of voting for y. Note that (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 is
bounded above by (2ei−1) 12 +1. Suppose ei = 12 ; this voter has utility (12+a) 12 +(12−a) 12
of voting for y which is strictly larger than his utility of voting for L2 which is 1. If
ei = 12 +a, this voter has utility 2(12 +a) 12 of voting for y and 1+(2a) 12 of voting for L2.
If a = 0, the utility of voting for y is strictly larger than that of voting for L2. If a = 12 ,
he obtains utility 2 of voting for both y and L2 and is indifferent. Since a ∈ [0, 12) and
continuity of U(.) in a, all voters with ei = 12 + a and si > 12 + a prefer y to L2. By
continuity and monotonicity of U(.) in ei for these voters, all voters with ei ≤ 12 + a
and si > 12 +a prefer y to L2. Symmetrically, voters with ei > 12 +a and si ≤ 12 +a prefer
y to L2. Voters with ei > 12 + a and si > 12 + a have utility 2(12 + a) 12 of voting for y
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and (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for L2. The set of indifferent voters is given by
si = 12 + 12(2(12 +a) 12 −(2ei−1) 12 )2. Since these voters’ utility of voting for y is constant
and increasing in si and ei for L2, voters with si > 12 + 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote
for L2, whereas those with si < 12 + 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 and si ≤ 12 : By Lemma 3, no voters with ei > 12 and si ≤ 12
vote for L1 or L2. These voters have utility of voting for x and y given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 si > 12 − a(12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 si ≤ 12 − a
and
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a
respectively. Voters with (ei, si) satisfying ei > 12 + a and si ≤ 12 − a have utility of(12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 of voting for each candidate, and are thus indifferent. Voters with
ei > 12 + a and si > 12 − a have utility (12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 of voting for y and utility(12 − a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 of voting for x. Since their utility of voting for x is bounded
above by their utility of voting for y, these voters therefore vote for y. Symmetrically,
voters with ei ≤ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 − a have strictly larger utility of voting for x. Voters
with ei ≤ 12 + a and si > 12 − a have utility (12 − a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 of voting for x
and (2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given by(32 −2si −a) 12 = (2ei − 12 −a) 12 , which simplifies to si = 1− ei. Since the utility of voting
for x is decreasing in si and the utility of voting for y is increasing in ei, voters in
this subpopulation with si > 1 − ei vote for y and those with si < 1 − ei vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 : By Lemma 3, no voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12
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vote for L1 or L2. These voters have utility of voting for x and y given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,1,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a(32 − a − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei > 12 − a
and
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,1,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 si > 12 + a(12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 si ≤ 12 + a
respectively. For voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 + a, the utility of voting for x and
y is the same, and they are indifferent. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤ 12 + a have
utility (12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 of voting for x and (12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for
y. Since (2si − 12 − a) 12 is bounded above by (12 + a) 12 for this subpopulation of voters,
they prefer x to y. Symmetrically, voters with ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a prefer y to x.
Voters with ei > 12 − a and si ≤ 12 + a have utility (32 − a − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 of voting for
x and (12 −a) 12 + (2si − 12 −a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given by(32 − a − 2ei) 12 = (2si − 12 − a) 12 , which reduces to 1 − ei = si. Since the utility of voting
for x is decreasing in ei for these voters and the utility of voting for y is increasing in
si, voters with si > 1 − ei vote for y and those with si ≤ 1 − ei vote for x. ∎
Lemma 5. Assume there exists candidates L1 and L2 with (ei, si) = (0,0) and (1,1)
respectively. Assume there exists a candidate y with (ei, si) = (12+a, 12+a). L2 receives
votes from all voters with ei > 12 and si > 12 satisfying si > 12 + 12(2(12 +a) 12 −(2ei−1) 12 )2.
L1 receives votes from voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 −a) 12 −(1−
2ei) 12 )2, voters with ei ≤ 12 and 12 < si ≤ 12+a satisfying si ≤ 14+ a2+ 12((1−2ei) 12−(12−a) 12 )2,
and voters with 12 < ei ≤ 12 +a and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12((2ei− 12 −a) 12 + (12 −a) 12 )2.
The remaining voters vote for y.
Proof: First, note that the frame is the same for all voters as in the previous two
lemmas. By Lemma 3, y is preferred to L2 for all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 and
all voters ei > 12 and si ≤ 12 . By Lemma 4, L2 receives votes from all voters with ei > 12
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and si > 12 satisfying si > 12 + 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 . These voters have utility of voting for y given by
U(ey, sy,1,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 si > 12 + a(12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 si ≤ 12 + a
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0,0,1,0) = (1 − 2ei) 12 .
Since (12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 > 1 for all a < 12 , and (1 − 2ei) 12 ≤ 1, all voters with ei ≤ 12
and si > 12 + a vote for y. The set of indifferent voters between L1 and y is given by
voters with si ≤ 12 + a satisfying si = 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2. Since the utility
of voting for y is monotonically increasing in si and the utility of voting for L1 is
monotonically decreasing in ei, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote
for L1 and those with si > 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 and si ≤ 12 . These voters have utility of voting for y given by
U(ey, sy,0,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0,0,0,1) = (1 − 2si) 12 .
Since (12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 > 1 for all a < 12 , and (1 − 2si) 12 ≤ 1, all voters with ei > 12 + a
vote for y. For voters with ei ≤ 12 + a, the set of indifferent voters between y and
L1 is given by si = 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for
y is monotonically increasing in ei and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically
84
decreasing in si, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12((2ei− 12 −a) 12 −(12 −a) 12 )2 vote for L1, and those
with si > 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 . These voters have utility of voting for y given by
U(ey, sy,1,1) = 2(1
2
− a) 12
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0,0,1,1) = (1 − 2ei) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 .
The set voters who are indifferent between y and L1 is given by si = 12 − 12(2(12 −
a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is constant with respect to ei
and si, and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and
si, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for L1 and voters with si >
1
2 − 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for y. ∎
Lemma 6. Assume there exists candidates L1 and L2 with (ei, si) = (0,0) and (1,1)
respectively. Assume there exists a candidate x with (ei, si) = (12−a, 12−a). L1 receives
votes from all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 +a) 12 −(1−2ei) 12 )2.
L2 receives votes from all voters with
1
2 − a < ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 satisfying si >
1
2 + 12((32 − a − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2, voters with ei > 12 and 12 − a < si ≤ 12 satisfying
si > 34 − a2 − 12((2ei − 1) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2, and voters with ei > 12 and si > 12 satisfying
si > 12 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2. The remaining voters vote for x.
Proof: Note that the frame is the same for all voters as in the preceding lemmas.
By Lemma 3, x is preferred to L1 for all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 and all voters
with ei > 12 and si ≤ 12 . By Lemma 4, L1 receives votes from all voters with ei ≤ 12 and
si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a) 12 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2.
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Voters with ei > 12 and si ≤ 12 : These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (32 − 2si − a) 12 si > 12 − a(12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 si ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1,1,0,1) = (2ei − 1) 12 .
Since 2ei − 1 ≤ 1 for all ei, all voters with si ≤ 12 − a prefer x to L2. The set of
voters with si > 12 indifferent between voting for x and L2 is given by si = 34 − a2 −
1
2((2ei − 1) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is monotonically decreasing
in si and the utility of voting for L2 is monotonically increasing in ei, voters with si >
3
4−a2−12((2ei−1) 12−(12−a) 12 )2 vote for L2 and those with si ≤ 34−a2−12((2ei−1) 12−(12−a) 12 )2
vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 : These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(32 − a − 2ei) 12 +( 12 − a) 12 ei > 12 − a(12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1,1,0,1) = (2si − 1) 12 .
All voters with ei ≤ 12−a prefer voting for x to L2. The set of voters with ei > 12−a who
are indifferent between x and L2 is given by si = 12 + 12((32 −a−2ei) 12 +(12 −a) 12 )2. Since
the utility of voting for x is monotonically decreasing in ei and the utility of voting
for L2 is monotonically increasing in si, voters with si > 12 + 12((32 −a−2ei) 12 +(12 −a) 12 )2
vote for L2 and voters with si ≤ 12 + 12((32 − a − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for x.
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Voters with ei > 12 and si > 12 : These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,0) = 2(1
2
− a) 12
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1,1,0,0) = (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 .
The set of voters indifferent between x and L2 is given by si = 12 + 12(2(12 −a) 12 − (2ei −
1) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is constant and the utility of voting for L2 is
monotonically increasing in both ei and si, voters with si > 12+ 12(2(12−a) 12 −(2ei−1) 12 )2
vote for L2 and voters with si ≤ 12 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for x. ∎
Lemma 7. Assume there exist candidates L1, x, and y with ideal policies (0,0),(12 − a, 12 − a), and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively.
1. If a ≤ 16 , L1 obtains votes from all voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying
si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2, voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2
satisfying si ≤ 14 − a2 + 12((12 + a − 2ei) 12 − (2a) 12 )2, and voters with ei > 14 + a2 and
si ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a) 12 − (2a) 12 )2.
Candidate y obtains votes from all voters with ei > 12 +a or si > 12 +a. Candidate
y additionally obtains votes from voters with 14 + a2 < ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a
satisfying si > 14 + a2 + 12((2ei − 12 + a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2, voters with
1
4 + a2 < si ≤ 12 − a and ei > 12 − a satisfying ei > 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 −(2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2, and voters with ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a satisfying
si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2.
The remaining voters vote for x.
2. If a > 16 , L1 obtains votes from all voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a satisfying
si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 −(12 +a−2ei) 12 )2, voters with ei ≤ 12 −a and 12 −a < si ≤ 14 + a2
satisfying ei ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 − (12 + a − 2si) 12 )2, and voters with
1
2 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2.
Candidate y obtains votes from all voters with ei > 12+a and si > 12+a. Candidate
y also obtains votes from voters with ei > 12 + a and 14 + a2 < si ≤ 12 + a satisfying
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si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2. Voters with si > 12 + a and 14 + a2 < ei ≤ 12 + a
vote for y if ei > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2. Voters with 14 + a2 < ei ≤ 12 + a
and 14 + a2 < si ≤ 12 +a vote for y if si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 −a) 12 −(2ei− 12 −a) 12 )2. Voters
with ei > 12 + a and 12 − a < si ≤ 14 + a2 vote for y if si > 12 − 12((12 + a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2.
Voters with 14 + a2 < ei ≤ 12 + a and 12 − a < si ≤ 14 + a2 vote for y if si > 12 − 12((2ei −
1
2 − a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2. Voters with 12 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2 and 14 + a2 < si ≤ 12 + a vote
for y if si > 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2. Voters with 12 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2 and
1
2 + a < si vote for y if ei > 12 − 12((12 + a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2.
Proof: Note that ei = maxj∈X ∣ej − ei∣ and si = maxj∈X ∣sj − si∣. Candidates have
positions (0,0), (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a). Thus, all citizens with ei ≤ 14 + a2 have
ei = 12 + a and citizens with ei > 14 + a2 have ei = 0. Similarly, citizens with si ≤ 14 + a2
have si = 12 + a and citizens with si > 14 + a2 have si = 0. The frames divide the unit
square into four subpopulations by ei and si. Candidate x lies in the group of citizens
with ei = si = 0 if 14 + a2 ≤ 12 − a, or a ≤ 16 . Alternatively, if a > 16 , x lies in the group
of citizens with ei = si = 12 + a. Candidate y always lies in the group of citizens with
ei = si = 0 and candidate L1 is always in the group of citizens with ei = si = 12 + a.
Consider the case with a ≤ 16 :
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2 : These voters have utility of voting for x given
by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a) = 2(2a) 12
and utility of voting for y given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a) = 0.
Clearly, none of these voters will vote for y. Their utility of voting for L1 is given by
U(0,0, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a) = (1
2
+ a − 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a − 2si) 12 .
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The set of voters who are indifferent between x and L1 is therefore given by
2(2a) 12 = (1
2
+ a − 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a − 2si) 12
which reduces to si = 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 −(12 +a−2ei) 12 )2. Since these voters all have the
same utility of voting for x whereas their utility of voting for L1 is strictly decreasing
in ei and si, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for L1 and those
with si > 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2 : These voters have utility of voting for L1
given by
U(0,0, 1
2
+ a,0) = (1
2
+ a − 2ei) 12 .
Their utility of voting for x is given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(2a) 12 + (2si − 12 + a) 12 si ≤ 12 − a(2a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 si > 12 − a
and their utility of voting for y is given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(2si − 12 − a) 12 si ≤ 12 + a(12 + a) 12 si > 12 + a
and thus all voters with si ≤ 12 − a prefer x to y. Voters with si > 12 + a prefer x to y if(12 + a) 12 < (2a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 . This condition holds by concavity, and thus these voters
prefer x to y. By continuity and monotonicity, voters with si ∈ (12 − a, 12 + a] prefer x
to y as well.
Since the utility of voting for L1 is bounded above by (12 + a) 12 , all voters with
si > 12 − a prefer x to L1. The set of voters who are indifferent between x and L1 is
given by voters satisfying si ≤ 12−a and (12+a−2ei) 12 = (2si− 12+a) 12 +(2a) 12 . After some
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algebra, this condition can be rewritten as si = 14−a2+ 12((12+a−2ei) 12−(2a) 12 )2. Since the
utility of voting for x is increasing in si and constant in ei, and the utility of voting for
L1 is decreasing in ei and constant in si, voters with si ≤ 14− a2+ 12((12+a−2ei) 12 −(2a) 12 )2
vote for L1 and voters with si > 14 − a2 + 12((12 + a − 2ei) 12 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2 : These voters have utility of voting for x
given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0, 1
2
+ a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (2a) 12 ei > 12 − a(2ei − 12 + a) 12 + (2a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for y given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0, 1
2
+ a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 ei > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a.
These voters also have utility of voting for L1 given by
(1
2
+ a − 2si) 12 .
It is immediately clear that voters with ei ≤ 12 − a prefer voting for x to y. Voters
with ei > 12 + a have utility (12 + a) 12 of voting for y and (12 − a) 12 + (2a) 12 of voting
for x. By concavity of U(.), these voters prefer x to y as well. By continuity and
monotonicity of U(.), voters with ei ∈ (12 − a, 12 + a] prefer x to y; thus, none of these
voters vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 −a have utility (12 −a) 12 +(2a) 12 of voting for x and (12 +a−2si) 12
of voting for L1. Since (12 +a−2si) 12 is bounded above by (12 +a) 12 , these voters prefer
x to L1. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a have utility (2ei − 12 + a) 12 + (2a) 12 of voting for x and(12 +a−2si) 12 of voting for L1. The set of voters who are indifferent between x and L1
is therefore given by si = 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a) 12 − (2a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting
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for x is monotonically increasing in ei and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically
decreasing in si, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a) 12 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for L1 and
voters with si > 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a) 12 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2 : These voters have utility of voting for x
given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(12 − a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a(12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 + a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a(2ei − 12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a(2ei − 12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 + a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
Their utility of voting for y is given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(12 + a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si > 12 + a(12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
and their utility of voting for L1 is U(0,0,0,0) = 0.
First, note that none of these voters will vote for L1. It is also clear that if
ei > 12 +a and si > 12 +a, these voters prefer y to x. Similarly, if ei ≤ 12 −a, and si ≤ 12 −a,
these voters prefer x to y. Voters with ei > 12 + a and 12 − a < si ≤ 12 + a have utility(12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y and 2(12 − a) 12 of voting for x and thus prefer
voting for y. Symmetrically, voters with si > 12 + a and 12 − a < ei ≤ 12 + a prefer y as
well. Voters with ei > 12 +a and si ≤ 12 −a have utility (12 +a) 12 + (2si− 12 −a) 12 of voting
for y and (12 −a) 12 + (2si− 12 +a) 12 of voting for x. These voters are indifferent between
x and y if a = 12 ; since a < 16 by assumption, these voters prefer y to x. Symmetrically,
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voters with si > 12 + a and ei ≤ 12 − a prefer y to x as well.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 −a and 12 −a < si ≤ 12 +a have utility (2ei− 12 −a) 12 +(2si− 12 −a) 12
of voting for y and (2ei − 12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 of voting for x. The set of indifferent
voters is given by si = 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2. Since
the utility of voting for y is monotonically decreasing in si and the utility of voting
for x is increasing at a slower rate in ei than the utility of voting for y, voters with
si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2 prefer voting for x and voters
with si > 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2 prefer voting for y.
Voters with si ≤ 12 − a and 12 − a < ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (2si −
1
2 − a) 12 of voting for y and (12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 + a) 12 of voting for x. The set of
indifferent voters is given by ei = 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2.
Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically increasing in ei and monotonically
increasing in si at a faster rate than the utility of voting for x, voters with ei ≤
1
4 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2 prefer voting for x and voters with
ei > 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a) 12 − (2si − 12 − a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2 prefer voting for y.
Voters with 12 −a < si ≤ 12 +a and 12 −a < si ≤ 12 +a have utility (2ei− 12 −a) 12 + (2si−
1
2 − a) 12 of voting for y and utility 2(12 − a) 12 of voting for x. The set of indifferent
voters is given by si = 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting
for y is monotonically increasing in both si and ei, and the utility of voting for x is
constant in both variables, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 −a) 12 − (2ei − 12 −a) 12 )2 prefer
voting for x. Voters with si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2 prefer voting for y.
Consider now the case with a > 16 .
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2 : These voters have utility of voting for x
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given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(2a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a(2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a(1 − 2ei) 12 + (2a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a(1 − 2ei) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a
and their utility of voting for y is 0. None of these voters, therefore, vote for y. Their
utility of voting for L1 is given by
U(0,0, 1
2
− a, 1
2
− a) = (1
2
+ a − 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a − 2si) 12
First, note that (12 +a−2x) 12 is bounded above by (1−2x) 12 . Thus, voters with ei >
1
2−a and si > 12−a prefer x to L1. Voters with ei ≤ 12−a and si ≤ 12−a have utility 2(2a) 12
of voting for x and utility (12+a−2ei) 12 +(12+a−2ei) 12 of voting for L1. The set of voters
who are indifferent between x and L1 is given by si = 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 −(12 +a−2ei) 12 )2.
Since the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and si and the
utility of voting for x is constant, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2
vote for L1 and voters with si > 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a have utility (2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 of voting for
x and utility (12 + a − 2ei) 12 + (12 + a − 2si) 12 of voting for L1. The set of indifferent
voters is given by ei = 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 − (12 + a − 2si) 12 )2. Since the
utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and si and the utility
of voting for x is decreasing monotonically in si at a slower rate than L1, voters
with ei ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 − (12 + a − 2si) 12 )2 vote for L1. Voters with
ei > 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 − (12 + a − 2si) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with si ≤ 12 − a and ei > 12 − a have utility (2a) 12 + (1 − 2ei) 12 of voting for
x and utility (12 + a − 2ei) 12 + (12 + a − 2ei) 12 of voting for L1. The set of indifferent
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voters is given by si = 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2. Since the
utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and si and the utility
of voting for x is decreasing monotonically in ei at a slower rate than L1, voters
with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for L1. Voters with
si > 14 + a2 − 12((2a) 12 + (1 − 2ei) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2 :
These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei > 12 − a(2a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for y given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 si > 12 + a(2si − 12 − a) 12 si ≤ 12 + a
Finally, these voters have utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0,0, 1
2
+ a,0) = (1
2
+ a − 2ei) 12
First, note that x is preferred to L1 by all voters. If ei > 12 −a, the utility of voting
for x is (1 − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 which is strictly larger than the utility of voting for L1
for any a < 12 . If ei ≤ 12 − a, the utility of voting for x is (2a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 . If ei = 0, the
utility of voting for L1 is (12 + a) 12 . By concavity of U(.), x is preferred to L1 for the
voters with ei = 0. Since the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in ei
and the utility of voting for x is constant in ei, x is preferred to L1 by all voters.
Note that the utility of voting for y is increasing in si for voters with si ≤ 12 +a and
constant for voters with si > 12 + a. By the same argument as above, x is preferred to
y when ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 + a. Thus x is preferred to y for all voters with ei ≤ 12 − a.
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Voters with ei > 12−a have utility (1−2ei) 12+(12−a) 12 of voting for x. Consider voters
with si ≤ 12+a. The set of indifferent voters is given by si = 14+a2+ 12((1−2ei) 12+(12−a) 12 )2.
Since the utility of voting for x is decreasing in ei and the utility of voting for y is
increasing in si, these voters vote for x if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((1−2ei) 12 +(12 −a) 12 )2 and they
vote for y if si > 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei) 12 + (12 − a) 12 )2.
Voters with si > 12 +a have utility of (12 +a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent
voters is given by ei = 12 − 12((12 + a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is
constant and the utility of voting for x is monotonically decreasing in ei, voters with
ei > 12 − 12((12 + a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for y. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − 12((12 + a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2
vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2 :
These voters have utility of voting for x
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0, 1
2
+ a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 − a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 si > 12 − a(12 − a) 12 + (2a) 12 si ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for y given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0, 1
2
+ a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(12 + a) 12 ei > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a
Their utility of voting for L1 is given by
U(0,0,0, 1
2
+ a) = (1
2
+ a − 2si) 12
First note that x is preferred to L1 by all of these voters for any a < 12 . If si > 12 −a,
by inspection it is clear that x is preferred to L1 for any a < 12 . The utility of voting
for L1 is bounded above by (12 + a) 12 . If si ≤ 12 − a, then by concavity of U(.) x is
preferred to L1.
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For voters with si ≤ 12 −a, x is preferred to y. The utility of voting for y is bounded
above by (12 + a) 12 , and the utility of voting for x is (12 − a) 12 + (2a) 12 . By concavity of
U(.), these voters prefer voting for x to y.
Voters with si > 12 −a have utility (12 −a) 12 + (1− 2si) 12 of voting for x. If ei > 12 +a,
these voters have utility (12 + a) 12 of voting for y. Thus, the set of indifferent voters
between x and y is given by si = 12 − 12((12 +a) 12 − (12 −a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting
for y is constant and the utility of voting for x is monotonically decreasing in si, voters
with si ≤ 12−12((12+a) 12−(12−a) 12 )2 vote for x and voters with si > 12−12((12+a) 12−(12−a) 12 )2
vote for y.
Voters with si > 12 − a and ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (12 − a) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 of voting
for x and (2ei − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given by
si = 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically
increasing in ei and the utility of voting for x is monotonically decreasing in si, voters
with si ≤ 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for x. Voters with si > 12 − 12((2ei − 12 −
a) 12 − (12 − a) 12 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2 :
These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(1
2
− a, 1
2
− a,0,0) = 2(1
2
− a) 12
and utility 0 of voting for L1. Thus, none of these voters vote for L1. Their utility of
voting for y is given by
U(1
2
+ a, 1
2
+ a,0,0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(12 + a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si > 12 + a(12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 ei > 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + 2si − 12 − a) 12 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
96
Note that all voters with ei > 12 + a and si > 12 + a vote for y. Voters with ei ≤ 12 + a
and si > 12 +a have utility (2ei− 12 −a) 12 +(12 +a) 12 of voting for y and 2(12 −a) 12 of voting
for x. The set of indifferent voters is given by ei = 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2.
Since the utility of voting for x is constant and the utility of voting for y is increasing
in ei, these voters vote for x if ei ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2. They vote for y if
ei > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2.
Voters with ei > 12 + a and si ≤ 12 + a have utility 2(12 − a) 12 of voting for x and
utility (12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given
by si = 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is constant
and the utility of voting for y is increasing in si, these voters vote for x if si ≤
1
4 + a2 + 12(2(12 −a) 12 − (12 +a) 12 )2. They vote for y if si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 −a) 12 − (12 +a) 12 )2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 + a have utility 2(12 − a) 12 of voting for x and(2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given
by si = 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2. By the same argument as above, these
voters vote for x if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2. They vote for y if
si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2. ∎
Lemma 8. Assume that there exist two candidate x and y with ideal policies (12 −
a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a), with a ∈ [0, 12) respectively. Assume that there exist two
candidates with ideal policies (0,0) and (1,1). Fix a citizen z with ideal policy (ez, sz)
satisfying ez ∈ (0, 12 − a) and sz ∈ (0, 12 − a) or ez ∈ (12 + a,1) and sz ∈ (12 + a,1). For all
citizens with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 , and ∀i such that ei ≤ 12
and si ≥ 12 , i does not vote for z.
Proof: Let candidate z have ideal policy (12 − b, 12 − b) where b ∈ (a, 12). The utility to
voter i with ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (3
2
− b − 2ei) 12 + (1
2
− b) 12 ei > 1
2
− b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
+ b) 12 + (1
2
− b) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
− b
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The same voters’ utilities of voting for candidate x are
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (3
2
− a − 2ei) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ei > 1
2
− a
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1
2
+ a) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
− a
On inspection, it is clear that for all voters with ei > 12 − a, x ≻ z. Additionally,
note that (12 + x) 12 + (12 − x) 12 is monotonically decreasing in x. Thus, all voters with
ei ≤ 12 −b prefer x to z as well. It remains to be shown that voters with ei ∈ (12 −b, 12 −a]
prefer x to z. These voters have utility (12 + a) 12 + (12 − a) 12 of voting for x, and utility(32 − b− 2ei) 12 + (12 − b) 12 of voting for z. Their utility of voting for z is bounded above
by (12 + b) 12 + (12 − b) 12 . Since (12 + x) 12 + (12 − x) 12 is monotonically decreasing in x and
b > a by assumption, these voters prefer x to z.
Now consider a voter i with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . The utility to voter i of voting for
candidate x is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1
2
− a) 12 + (1
2
+ a) 12 1
2
− a > si
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1
2
− a) 12 + (3
2
− a − 2si) 12 1
2
− a ≤ si
The utility to voter i of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
− b) 12 + (1
2
+ b) 12 1
2
− b > si
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
− b) 12 + (3
2
− b − 2si) 12 1
2
− b ≤ si
As above, it is clear that for voters with si > sx or si ≤ sz, candidate x is preferred to
candidate z. Voters with si ∈ (12 − b, 12 − a) obtain utility (12 − b) 12 + (32 − b − 2si) 12 of
voting for candidate z and utility (12 − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 of voting for candidate x. Note
that (12 − b) 12 + (32 − b − 2si) 12 is bounded above by (12 − b) 12 + (12 + b) 12 . Since b < a by
assumption, and (12 + x) 12 + (12 − x) 12 is monotonically decreasing in x, these voters
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prefer x to z as well.
To complete the proof of the lemma, it remains to be shown that candidate y,
having ideal policy (12 + a, 12 + a) is strictly preferred by these voters to any candidate
z with ideal policy (12 + b, 12 + b), where b > a. The utility to voter i with ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 of voting for candidate y is
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1
2
− a) 12 + (2si − 1
2
− a) 12 si ≤ 1
2
+ a
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1
2
− a) 12 + (1
2
+ a) 12 si > 1
2
+ a
The same voter’s utility of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
− b) 12 + (2si − 1
2
− b) 12 si ≤ 1
2
+ b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
− b) 12 + (1
2
+ b) 12 si > 1
2
+ b
For all i with si ≤ 12+a and si > 12+b, it is clear that voting for y is preferred to voting
for z. For voters with si ∈ (12 +a, 12 + b], voting for y is preferred if (12 −a) 12 + (12 +a) 12 ≥(12 − b) 12 + (2si − 12 − b) 12 . Note that the right hand side of this inequality is bounded
above by (12 − b) 12 + (12 + b) 12 . Thus, all voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 prefer to vote for y instead of z.
Consider now voters with ideal policy ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . These voters’ utility of
voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (1
2
+ b) 12 + (1
2
− b) 12 ei > 1
2
+ b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (2ei − 1
2
− b) 12 + (1
2
− b) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
+ b
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These voters utility of voting for candidate y is
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1
2
+ a) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ei > 1
2
+ a
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (2ei − 1
2
− a) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
+ a
Clearly, for any voters with ei > 12 +b or ei ≤ 12 +a, voting for y is preferred to voting
for z. Voters with ei ∈ (12 +a, 12 + b] obtain utility of (12 +a) 12 + (12 −a) 12 from voting for
y, and utility (2ei − 12 − b) 12 + (12 − b) 12 from voting for z. Since (2ei − 12 − b) 12 + (12 − b) 12
is bounded above by (12 + b) 12 + (12 − b) 12 , these voters prefer voting for y as well. ∎
Lemma 9. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies (12 −a, 12 −a)
and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two candidates with ideal
policies (0,0) and (1,1). Let s¯ = e¯ = 12( 2√2 − (12 + a) 12 )2 + 14 + a2 . An entrant with ideal
policy (12 , 12) obtains all votes from voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 , and from all voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . An entrant
with ideal policy (12 , 12) also obtains votes from voters with ideal policies satisfying
ei ∈ [1−e¯, e¯] or si ∈ [1−s¯, s¯]. Finally, voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [12−a,1−e¯]
and si ∉ [1 − s¯, s¯] vote for the entrant if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (32 − 2ei − a) 12 )2 and voters
with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [e¯, 12 + a] and si ∉ [1 − s¯, s¯] vote for the entrant if
si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12( 2√2 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2.
Proof: First, note that all voters have utility 2√
2
of voting for a candidate with ideal
policy (12 , 12). By Lemma 8, the median entrant obtains all votes from citizens with
ideal policies (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 or ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 .
Consider citizens with ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12 . Note that all
of these citizens prefer y to x. These citizens can be broken up into four subsets by
whether ei ≥ 12 + a, si ≥ 12 + a, both, or neither. Citizens with both ei and si ≥ 12 + a
have utility of 2(12 + a) 12 of voting for y, and therefore the median entrant receives
no votes from this group. Consider now the subset of citizens with ei ≥ 12 + a and
si ≤ 12 + a. These citizens have utility (12 + a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y and
2√
2
of voting for the median entrant. The set of indifferent citizens are those with
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si = s¯ = 12( 2√2 −(12 +a) 12 )2+ 14 + a2 . Since the utility of voting for y is increasing in si, all
citizens with ei ≥ 12 +a and si ≤ s¯ vote for the median entrant. Similarly, the subset of
citizens with ei ≤ 12 +a and si ≥ 12 +a have utility (2ei− 12 −a) 12 +(12 +a) 12 of voting for y
and 2√
2
of voting for the median entrant. The set of indifferent citizens are those with
ei = e¯ = 12( 2√2 −(12 +a) 12 )2+ 14 + a2 . Since the utility of voting for y is increasing in ei, all
citizens with si ≥ 12 + a and ei ≤ e¯ vote for the median entrant. Finally, citizens with
si ≤ 12 + a and ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a) 12 + (2si − 12 − a) 12 of voting for y and
2√
2
of voting for the median entrant. Thus, the set of indifferent citizens are given by
si(ei) = 12( 2√2 −(2ei− 12 −a) 12 )2+ 14 + a2 . Since the utility of voting for y is increasing in ei
and si, all citizens satisfying si ≤ 12+a and ei ≤ 12+a with si ≤ 12( 2√2−(2ei− 12−a) 12 )2+ 14+ a2
vote for z, while those with si > 12( 2√2 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2 + 14 + a2 vote for y.
Now consider citizens with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 . These
citizens all prefer x to y. Similarly, they can be broken up into four subsets by
whether ei ≤ 12 −a, si ≤ 12 −a, both or neither. Citizens with both ei and si ≤ 12 −a have
utility 2(12 + a) 12 of voting for x, and therefore prefer x to z. Citizens with ei ≤ 12 − a
and si > 12 −a have utility (32 −2si−a) 12 +(12 +a) 12 of voting for x. The set of indifferent
citizens are those with si = 1− s¯ = 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (12 +a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting
for x is decreasing in si, all citizens with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≥ 1− s¯ vote for the entrant,
while those with ei ≤ 12 − a and si < 1 − s¯ vote for x. Citizens with si ≤ 12 − a and
ei > 12 − a have utility (32 − 2ei − a) 12 + (12 + a) 12 of voting for x. The set of indifferent
citizens is given by ei = 1 − e¯ = 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (12 + a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting
for x is decreasing in ei, all citizens with si ≤ 12 − a and ei ≥ 1 − e¯ vote for z, whereas
citizens with si ≤ 12 − a and ei < 1 − e¯ vote for x. Finally, citizens with si > 12 − a
and ei > 12 − a obtain utility (32 − 2si − a) 12 + (32 − 2ei − a) 12 of voting for x. The set of
indifferent citizens is given by si(ei) = 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (32 −2ei −a) 12 )2. All citizens with
si and ei satisfying si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (32 − 2ei − a) 12 )2 vote for z, whereas those with
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ei and si satisfying si < 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (32 − 2ei − a) 12 )2 vote for x. ∎
Lemma 10. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies (12−a, 12−a)
and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two candidates with ideal
policies (0,0) and (1,1). An entrant z with ideal policy (12 − b, 12 − b), where b ∈ (0, a),
obtains votes from all voters with (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 or ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 . Let e = s = 34− a2− 12(2(12+b) 12−(12+a) 12 )2. Let e¯ = s¯ = 14+ a2+ 12(2(12−b) 12−(12+a) 12 )2.
Additionally, all voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [e, e¯] or si ∈ [s, s¯] vote for z.
Finally, voters with ei ∈ [12 −a, e] vote for z if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 + b) 12 − (32 −2ei −a) 12 )2,
while voters with ei ∈ [e¯, 12 + a] vote for z if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − b) 12 − (2ei − 12 − a) 12 )2.
Proof: Follows the exact same argument as Lemma 9. The only difference is the
utility voters have for z. Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12 have
utility 2(12 − b) 12 of voting for z, whereas voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12
and si ≤ 12 have utility of voting for z given by
U(ez, sz, ei, si) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(32 − 2ei − b) 12 + (32 − 2si − b) 12 ei ≥ 12 − b, si ≥ 12 − b(32 − 2ei − b) 12 + (12 + b) 12 ei ≥ 12 − b, si < 12 − b(12 + b) 12 + (32 − 2si − b) 12 ei < 12 − b, si ≥ 12 − b
2(12 + b) 12 ei < 12 − b, si < 12 − b
As before, by Lemma 8 voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 and voters with ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 vote for z. ∎
Lemma 11. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies (12−a, 12−a)
and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two candidates with ideal
policies (0,0) and (1,1). An entrant z with ideal policy (12 + b, 12 + b), where b ∈ (0, a)
obtains all votes from voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 and from voters with ei ≤ 12 and
si ≥ 12 . Let e = s = 34− a2− 12(2(12−b) 12+(12+a) 12 )2. Let s¯ = e¯ = 14+ a2+ 12(2(12+b) 12−(12+a) 12 )2.
Additionally, voters with ei ∈ [e, e¯] or si ∈ [s, s¯] vote for z. Finally, voters with
ei ∈ [12 −a, e] vote for z if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 − b) 12 − (32 − 2ei −a) 12 )2, whereas those with
si ∈ [s¯, 12 + a] vote for z if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 + b) 12 − (12 + a) 12 )2.
Proof: Follows the same argument as Lemma 9. The only difference is the utility
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voters have for z. Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 have utility
2(12 − b) 12 of voting for z, whereas voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12
have utility of voting for z given by
U(ez, sz, ei, si) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(12 + b) 12 ei ≥ 12 + b, si ≥ 12 + b(12 + b) 12 + (2si − 12 − b) 12 ei ≥ 12 + b, si < 12 + b(2ei − 12 − b) 12 + (12 + b) 12 ei < 12 + b, si ≥ 12 + b(2ei − 12 − b) 12 + (2si − 12 − b) 12 ei < 12 + b, si < 12 + b
As before, by Lemma 8 voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 and voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12
vote for z. ∎
Proof of Proposition 4: Lemmas 3 through 11 characterize vote shares for
candidates in equilibrium, for any linear entrant, and if any equilibrium candidate
exits. Assume F (ei, si) is symmetric over the line si = 1 − ei.
Suppose there exists four candidates, L1, L2, x, and y with ideal policies (0,0),(1,1), (12−a, 12−a), and (12+a, 12+a) respectively. In order for this to be an equilibrium
where candidates L1 and L2 lose with certainty, candidates x and y must both win
with positive probability. If not, by exiting, they would guarantee the victory of the
other moderate, and thus have no effect on the outcome of the election, but save cost
c. In equilibrium, candidates x and y receive a payoff of 12b− c− 12d(x, y). By exiting,
each candidate would receive −d(x, y). Therefore, in order to sustain this equilibrium,
we require b ≥ 2c − d(x, y).
Candidates L1 and L2 obtain a payoff of −12(d(Li, x)+d(Li, y))− c in equilibrium.
Since the equilibrium is fully symmetric, consider, without loss of generality, candidate
L1. By exiting, L1 shifts the frame of reference for all voters who have ei ≥ 12 or
si ≥ 12 . As noted above in Lemma ??, by exiting candidate L1 tilts the perception of
y favorably relative to x for all voters whose frame changes. Candidate x, however,
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obtains votes from all voters who previously voted for L1. If the set of voters who
would have voted for L1 is larger than the set of voters for whom the change in frame
causes them to vote for y, then L1 obtains −d(L1, x) by exiting, which is strictly
larger and thus this cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, only distributions and
candidate configurations which satisfy vy(L2, x, y) > vx(L2, x, y) and vx(L1, x, y) >
vy(L1, x, y) can support this equilibrium. If those conditions are satisfied, L1 obtains−d(L1, y) by exiting. Since this is a linear equilibrium, d(L1, y) can be decomposed
as d(L1, x)+ d(x, y). Thus, in order for L1 and L2 to find it optimal to enter, it must
be the case that −12[2d(L1, x) + d(x, y)] − c ≥ −d(L1, x) − d(x, y), or 32d(x, y) ≥ c.
Finally, if any potential candidate can enter and win the election, they obtain a
payoff of b− c by doing so. In equilibrium, they would obtain a payoff of −12[d(x, i)+
d(y, i)]. They will not find it optimal to enter if b ≥ c − 12d(x, i) − 12d(y, i). No other
sure losers would like to enter. The frames are invariant to any other entrant since
the distribution is bounded at 0 and 1 in each dimension. If they are extreme with
respect to party competition, they exclusively cannibalize votes from their preferred
moderate. Since F (.) is symmetric over the set of voters indifferent between x and y,
any centrist sure loser who has preferences over x and y extracts strictly more votes
from her preferred moderate. ∎
Appendix C
Appendices to Giving the Gift of Guilt
Avoidance
C.1 Proof of Representation Theorem
C.1.1 Preliminaries
A set of linear utility functions F is redundant if one of them is constant, or if there
exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that f = αg +β for some f, g ∈ F . By Herstein and Milnor
(1953), the latter condition holds if and only if f and g represent the same preference
ranking.
Lemma 1. If S ≥ 2 and functions u1, . . . , uS ∈ U are not redundant, then there are
x∗1, . . . , x∗S ∈X such that ui(x∗i ) > ui(x∗j ) for all i ≠ j.
Proof. This proof is due to Kopylov (2009a). Take any k, ` ∈ S such that k > `. Then
uk and u` are non-constant and represent different rankings of X. Without loss of
generality, uk(x) ≥ uk(y) and u`(y) > u∣ell(x) for some x, y ∈ X. Take x′, y′ ∈ X such
that uk(x′) > uk(y′). Take ε > 0 such that u`(εy′ + (1 − ε)y) > u`(εx′ + (1 − ε)x). Let
xk` = εx′+(1−ε)x and x`k = εy′+(1−ε)y. Then uk(xk`) > uk(x`k) and u`(x`k) > u`(xk`).
For any i ∈ S, let
x∗i = ∑
k,`∈S,k>`
2
S(S − 1)xik`,
where xik` = xk` if ui(xk`) ≥ ui(x`k) and xik` = x`k otherwise. Then for any i, j ∈ S such
that i ≠ j,
ui (x∗i ) = ∑
k,`∈S,k>`
2
S(S − 1)ui (xik`) > ∑k,`∈S,k>` 2S(S − 1)ui (xjk`) = ui (x∗j )
because ui(xij) > ui(xji) and ui(xik`) ≥ ui(xjk`) for any k, ` ∈ S such that k > `.
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C.1.2 Axioms Imply Representation
Lemma 2. The metric space (M1, µ1), where µ1 is the Hausdorff metric defined in
section 1.3.1, satisfies the following properties:
1. M1 is compact
2. mixture operation mapping [0,1] ×M1 ×M1 →X is continuous
3. ∀ α ∈ [0,1] and a, b, a′, b′ ∈M1
µ1(αa + (1 − α)a,αb + (1 − α)b) ≤ max{µ1(a, b), µ1(a′, b′)}
Proof. Take a, b, a′, b′ ∈ M1. Suppose max{µ1(a, b), µ1(a′, b′)} = ε. Then b ⊂ Nε(a),
and a ⊂ Nε(b), where
Nε(a) = {x ∈X ∣d(x, a) ≤ ε}
d(x, a) = min
y∈a d(x, y)
Given y ∈ b, there exists x ∈ a such that d(x, y) ≤ ε.
Given y′ ∈ b′, there exists x′ ∈ a′ such that d(x′, y′) ≤ ε.
Therefore, d(αx + (1 − α)x′, αy + (1 − α)y′) ≤ ε, which implies
{αy + (1 − α)y′∣y ∈ b, y′ ∈ b′} ⊂ Nε {αx + (1 − α)x′∣x ∈ a, x′ ∈ a′}
And the same is true in reverse, thus µ1(αa + (1 − α)a′, αb + (1 − α)b′) ≤ ε.
By Lemma 2, Partial Set Betweenness, and Corollary 3.3 of Theorem 2.1 in Kopy-
lov (2009a), this has utility representation of the form
W (A) = max
a∈A w(a) −maxb∈A v1(b) −maxc∈A v2(c),
for some w, v1, v2 ∈ U , where U is the set of all continuous linear functions u ∶X →
R.
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Lemma 3. Given Partial Set-Betweenness, the preceding representation can be writ-
ten in the form
W (A) = max
a∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)] −maxb∈a V (b) − κmaxc∈A U(c)
for some v ∈ U and κ ≥ 0.
Proof. Let U = w − v1 − v2. Suppose first that v1, v2, U are redundant. This implies
one of the following cases:
1. v1 and v2 are redundant. Then for each A ∈M0,
W (A) = max
a∈A w(a) −maxb∈A [v1(b) + v2(b)]
This is equivalent to the desired form for V = v1 + v2 and κ = 0.
2. v1 = αU + β for some α > 0 and β ∈ R. Then the utility function has the desired
form for V = v2 and κ = α:
W (A) = max
a∈A [U(a) + κU(a) + β + V (a)] −maxc∈A [κU(b) − β] −maxb∈A V (b)
3. v2 = αU + β for some α > 0 and β ∈ R. This is equivalent to the preceding case;
the utility function has the desired form for v = v1 and κ = α.
4. v1 and v2 are not redundant, and U is constant. In this case the preferences will
violate Partial Set-Betweenness. To see, take a, b ∈ M1 s.t. v1(a) > v1(b) and
v2(b) > v2(a). Without loss of generality w(a) ≥ w(b). Let c = 12a + 12b. Then
v1(a) > v1(c) > v1(b) and v2(b) > v2(c) > v2(a). Thus
W ({a, c}) = w(a) − v1(a) − v2(c) > w(a) − v1(a) − v2(b) =W ({a, b, c})
W ({y, z}) = w(c) − v1(c) − v2(b) > w(a) − v1(a) − v2(b) =W ({a, b, c})
because w(c) − v1(c) = v2(c) + u(c) > v2(a) + u(a) = w(a) − v1(a). Rankings{a, c} ≻ {a, b, c} and {b, c} ≻ {a, b, c} violate Partial Set-Betweenness because{a, c},{b, c} ∈Mc.
Suppose U, v1, v2 are not redundant. Then one of the following must hold.
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1. w, v1, v2, U are all not redundant. This will violate Partial Set-Betweenness. By
Lemma 1, there are a, b1, b2, c ∈M1 such that
w(a) > max{w(b1), w(b2), w(c)}
v1(b1) > max{v1(a), v1(b2), v1(c)}
v2(b2) > max{v2(a), v2(b1), v2(c)}
U(c) > max{U(a), U(b1), U(b2)}
Let A = {a, b1, c} and B = {a, b2, c}. Then both utilities
W (A) = w(a) − v1(b1) −max{v2(a), v2(b1), v2(c)} and
W (B) = w(a) −max{v1(a), v1(b2), v1(c)} − v2(b2)
are strictly greater than the utility
W (A ∪B) = w(a) − v1(b1) − v2(b2)
Yet the rankings A ≻ A ∪ B and B ≻ A ∪ B violate Partial Set-Betweenness
because A,B ∈Mc.
2. w = αU + β for some α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R. This, too, will violate Partial Set-
Betweenness. By Lemma 1, there are b1, b2, c ∈M1 s.t.
v1(b1) > max{v1(b2), v1(c)}
v2(b2) > max{v2(b1), v2(c)}
u(c) > max{u(b1), u(b2)}
Then w(c) > max{w(b1),w(b2)}. Let A = {b1, c} and B = {b2, c}. Then
W (A) = w(c) − v1(b1) −max{v2(b1), v2(c)} > w(c) − v1(b1) − v2(b2) =W (A ∪B)
W (B) = w(c) −max{v1(b2), v1(c)} − v2(b2) > w(c) − v1(b1) − v2(b2) =W (A ∪B)
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But, again, A ≻ A ∪B and B ≻ A ∪B violate Partial Set-Betweenness because
A,B ∈Mc.
3. w = αv1 + β for some α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R. If α ≥ 1, then ∀ A ∈M0,
W (A) = max
a∈A [w(a) − v1(a)] −maxb∈A v2(b)
has the required form with V = v2 and κ = 0.
W (A) = max
a∈A [U(a) + v1(a) + V (a) − v1(a)] −maxb∈A V (b)= max
a∈A [U(a) + V (a)] −maxb∈A V (b)
If α < 1, then ∀ A ∈M0,
W (A) = max
a∈A w′(a) −maxb∈A v′1(b) −maxc∈A v2(c)
where w′ = 0 and v′1 = v1−w = (1−α)v1−β.1 Then w′ = 0⋅u, which implies v′1, v2, u
are not redundant. By case two, this contradicts Partial Set-Betweenness.
4. w = αv2 + β for some α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R. This case is analogous to the previous
case.
Ergo, representation exists.
For the singleton menu of menus A = a, W (A) = U(a). As singleton menus of
menus satisfy Set-Betweenness, by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001),
U(a) = max
x∈a [u(x) + v(x)] −maxy∈a v(y),
where u and v are linear, positive functions.
1If α > 1, this is not a positive function.
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C.1.3 Representation Implies Axioms
The usual argument implies Weak Order and Continuity.
To show Independence, recall αA + (1 − α)C = {αa + (1 − α)c∣a ∈ A, c ∈ C}
W (αA + (1 − α)C) = max
a∈A,c∈C [(1 + κ)U (αa + (1 − α)c) + V (αa + (1 − α)c)]− max
b∈A,d∈C V (αb + (1 − α)d) − maxc∈A,e∈C κU (αc + (1 − α)e)
By linearity of U and V , preceding equals:
(1 + κ) [max
a∈A αU(a) +maxc∈C (1 − α)U(c)] −maxb∈A αV (a) +maxd∈C (1 − α)V (c)−κ [max
c∈A αU(c) +maxe∈C (1 − α)U(e)]
which is equal to αW (A)+(1−α)W (C). Clearly, W (A) ≥W (B)⇒ αW (A)+(1−
α)W (C) ≥ αW (B)+(1−α)W (C), which impliesW (αA + (1 − α)C) ≥W (αB + (1 − α)C),
and thus Independence holds.
To show Partial Set-Betweenness, note that it consists of two parts.
1. A ≿ B ⇒ A ≿ A ∪B
2. A ≿ B and A,B ∈Mc⇒ A ∪B ≿ B
Each element will be shown in turn. Begin with 1. Consider A,B s.t. A ≿ B. This
implies W (A) ≥W (B).
W (A) = max
a∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)] −maxb∈A V (b) − κmaxc∈A U(c)
W (B) = max
a′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)] −maxb′∈B V (b′) − κmaxc′∈B U(c′)
W (A ∪B) = max
a′′∈{a,a′} [(1 + κ)U(a′′) + V (a′′)] − maxb′′∈{b,b′}V (b′′) − κ maxc′′∈{c,c′}U(c′′)
If maxa∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)] ≥ maxa′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)], then clearlyW (A) ≥
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W (A ∪ B). If maxa′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)] > maxa∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)], then
W (B) >W (A ∪B), so again, clearly W (A) ≥W (A ∪B).
Turn to 2. Given A ≿ B and A,B ∈ Mc, κmaxc∈AU(c) = κmaxc′∈B U(c′). Call
this value γ. Thus,
W (A) = max
a∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)] −maxb∈A V (b) − γ
W (B) = max
a′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)] −maxb′∈B V (b′) − γ
W (A ∪B) = max
a′′∈{a,a′} [(1 + κ)U(a′′) + V (a′′)] − maxb′′∈{b,b′}V (b′′) − γ
If maxa∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)] ≥ maxa′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)], then clearlyW (A∪
B) ≥ W (B). If maxa′∈B [(1 + κ)U(a′) + V (a′)] > maxa∈A [(1 + κ)U(a) + V (a)], then
W (A ∪B) =W (B), because the maxima are the same for each term.
Finally, to show Singleton Set-Betweenness, observe that
W ({a}) = U(a) = max
x∈a [u(a) + v(a)] −maxy∈a v(y);
by the Gul-Pesendorfer representation theorem, this satisfies Set-Betweenness.
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